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FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
MAY 2 6 1993 
MaryT.Noonan 
Clftrk of the Court 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JIM PRATT HANSEN, et al., 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
v. 
GEORGE SUTTON, et al., 
Defendants/Respondents, 
CITATION OF 
SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITIES 
Appeal No. 920686-CA 
Pursuant to Rule 24(j), U.R.App.P., Defendants/ 
Appellants George Sutton, individually, and in his capacity as 
Commissioner of Financial Institutions of the State of Utah, and 
in his capacity as Trustee of the retained assets of Murray First 
Thrift and Loan Company, Elaine B. Weis, individually and in her 
capacity as former Commissioner of Financial Institutions of the 
State of Utah, and the Utah Department of Financial Institutions, 
respectfully submit this citation of supplemental authorities in 
support of Defendants/Appellants' Brief. 
The authorities were located by the undersigned counsel 
while preparing for the oral argument in this matter set for May 
26, 1993. In particular, the authorities cited (especially Glenn 
v. First Nat. Bank in Grand Junction, 868 F. 2d 368 (10th Cir. 
1989)) support Defendants/Appellants' argument a Court is not 
required to grant a motion for leave to amend a complaint when 
the plaintiff would otherwise have an absolute right to amend 
under Rule 15(a), U.R.C.P., had leave to amend not been 
requested. This argument is set forth on pages 50-55 of 
Defendants/Appellants' Brief 
The authorities and citations are as follows: 
Correa-Martinez v. Arrillaqa-Belendez, 903 F. 2d 49, 59 
(1st Cir. 1990). 
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). 
Glenn v. First Nat. Bank in Grand Junction, 868 F. 2d 
368 (10th Cir. 1989). 
Mende v. Dun & Bradstreet. Inc., 670 F. 2d 129, 131 
(9th Cir. 1982) 
Mertens v. Hummell, 587 F. 2d 862, (7th Cir. 1978). 
Perkins v. Silverstein, 939 F. 2d 463, 471-72 (7th Cir. 
1991) 
Shall v. Henry, 211 F. 2d 226, 230-31 ((7th Cir. 1954). 
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Copies of these citations are attached hereto for the 
Court's and other counsels' convenience. 
DATED this *2.vTk day of May, 1993. 
JAN GRAHAM (#1231) 
Attorney General 
^ 
BlfYCEjH, PETTEY'(#259£) 
Assistant Attorney General 
36 South State Street, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorneys for: the Utah Department 
of Financial Institutions; 
George Sutton, individually, 
and as Commissioner of 
Financial Institutions of the 
State of Utah, and as Trustee 
of the Retained Assets of 
Murray First Thrift and Loan 
Company; and Elaine B. Weis, 
individually, and as former 
Commissioner of Financial 
Institutions of the State of 
Utah 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this day of May, 1993, 
I did cause to be delivered by hand a true and exact copy of the 
foregoing "Citation of Supplemental Authorities" to each of the 
following: 
Michael N. Emery, Esq. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Key Bank Tower, Suite 700 
50 Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Attorney for George Sutton, as 
Commissioner in Possession of the 
Industrial Loan Guaranty 
Corporation of Utah, and the 
Industrial Loan Guaranty 
Corporation of Utah 
Scott B. Mitchell, Esq. 
LEHMAN, MITCHELL & WALDO 
136 South Main Street, Suite 721 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellants 
^S/IM^IU ^ # & T 
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feitures under § 881(aX6). See, e.g.t Unit-
ed States v. $250,000, 808 F.2d at 897. 
Moreover, courts in this circuit and else-
where have repeatedly applied the burden-
shifting procedures and rules of 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1615 to the forfeiture of real property. 
See, e.g., United States v. Parcel of Land 
and Residence Located Thereon at 5 Bell 
Rock Rd, 896 F.2d 605, 606 (1st Cir.1990); 
United States v. South 28.19 Acres of 
Land, 694 F.Supp. 1252, 1253-54 (E.D.La. 
1988); United States v. Premises Known 
as 2639 Meetinghouse Rd, 633 F.Supp. 
979, 986-87 (E.D.Pa.1986); see also United 
States v. A Parcel of Land with a Build-
ing Located Thereon at 40 Moon Hill Rd, 
884 F.2d 41, 42-43 (1st Cir.1989) (upholding 
the forfeiture of real property pursuant to 
21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7)). Laliberte's argu-
ment of unconstitutional vagueness is with-
out merit. 
Even more meritJess is Laliberte's argu-
ment that the allocation of burdens under 
19 U.S.C. § 1615 is unconstitutional with 
respect to § 881 forfeitures. That argu-
ment has already been explicitly addressed 
and rejected by this circuit. United States 
v. $250,000, 808 F.2d at 900. 
The judgment of the district court is 
Affirmed. 
(O iMYNUMBfRSYSTj*^ S * 
Jorge CORREA-MARTINEZ, 
Plaintiff, Appellant, 
v. 
Rene ARRILLAGA-BELENDEZ, et al., 
Defendants, Appellees. 
No. 89-2011. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
First Circuit 
Heard March 7, 1990. 
Decided April 30, 1990. 
Former administrative employee 
named to a trust position in Puerto Rico's 
ARRILLAGA-BELENDEZ 49 
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judicial system brought action against 
three jurists, alleging that he had been 
forced to resign in violation of his due 
process and First Amendment rights. The 
United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Puerto Rico, Juan M. Perez-Gime-
nez, Chief Judge, dismissed. Employee ap-
pealed. The Court of Appeals, Selya, Cir-
cuit Judge, held that: (1) employee did not 
have due process property interest in con-
tinued employment; (2) allegation that em-
ployee was terminated "from his employ-
ment because of his close association with 
[former administrative judge] * * * with 
whom defendants have personal and politi-
cal differences" stated no cause of action 
for First Amendment violation under 
§ 1983; and (3) District Court did not 
abuse its discretion in failing to grant em-
ployee's request for leave to amend com-
plaint. 
Affirmed. 
1. Federal Civil Procedure «=>1829 
Despite highly deferential reading 
which Court of Appeals accords litigant's 
complaint under rule governing motions to 
dismiss for failure to state claim, Court 
need not credit bald assertions, periphrastic 
circumlocutions, unsubstantiated conclu-
sions, or outright vituperation. Fed.Rules 
Civ.Proc.Rule 12(b)(6), 28 U.S.C.A. 
2. Civil Rights «=>234 
Civil rights plaintiff may not prevail on 
motion to dismiss for failure to state claim 
simply by asserting inequity and tacking on 
self-serving conclusion that defendant was 
motivated by discriminatory animus; al-
leged facts must specifically identify partic-
ular instances of discriminatory treatment 
and, as logical exercise, adequately support 
thesis that discrimination was unlawful. 
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 12(b)(6), 28 U.S. 
C.A. 
3. Constitutional Law e»277(2) 
Engagement letter from personnel di-
rector to administrative employee named to 
trust position in Puerto Rico's judicial sys-
tem could not effectively confer constitu-
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tionally protected property interest on em-
ployee contrary to statutory/regulatory 
framework for government employment. 
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; U.S.C.A. Const. 
Amend. 14; 3 L.P.R.A. §§ 1349-1351. 
4. Master and Servant e=>2 
Where employment scheme, whether 
statutory, contractual, or mixed, is silent 
on specific points, pocked with fissures, or 
infected by serious strain of ambiguity, 
employer's conduct or declarations may ap-
propriately be used to fill gaps so as to 
create constitutionally protected property 
interest in continued employment. U.S. 
C.A. ConstAmend. 14; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. 
5. Constitutional Law e=»277(2) 
Territories «=>23 
Principles of fundamental fairness did 
not afford administrative employee named 
to trust position in Puerto Rico's judicial 
system a constitutionally cognizable prop-
erty interest in continued employment, 
even though employee served judicial 
branch well for seven years, toiling under 
four administrative judges, none of whom 
ever questioned his trustworthiness or 
competence; employee's subjective expect-
ancies could not override unambiguous 
commands of civil service laws under which 
employee could be dismissed in discretion 
of nominating authority. 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1983; U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14; 3 L.P. 
R.A. §§ 1349-1351. 
6. Constitutional Law e»277(2) 
Length of employment and good be-
havior, in and of themselves, customarily 
do not create constitutionally protected 
property interest in continued employment. 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14; 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1983. 
7. Constitutional Law «=»277(2) 
Absent legal source other than superi-
or officer's unilateral and/or unauthorized 
actions contrary to Puerto Rico law, 
government worker's pretensions to consti-
tutionally cognizable property right in his 
employment must be turned aside. U.S. 
C.A. ConstAmend. 14; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. 
8. Master and Servant <S=>30(1) 
Fact that superiors have not exercised 
discretion to dismiss at-will employee does 
not normally preclude them from changing 
their mind, nor does it preclude new superi-
or officer from exercising prerogative. 
9. Constitutional Law $=>277(2) 
Absent adequate allegation of discrimi-
nation based on political affiliation of for-
mer administrative employee named to 
trust position in Puerto Rico's judicial sys-
tem, regulation allegedly providing that 
employees "shall receive just and equitable 
treatment, without discrimination of any 
type based on • * * political affiliation" did 
not apply to create constitutionally cogniza-
ble property interest in continued employ-
ment U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14; 42 U.S. 
C.A. § 1983. 
10. Federal Courts «=>915 
Substantive due process claim of termi-
nated public employee which was not 
pressed on appeal was waived. U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 14. 
11. Constitutional Law e=»82(ll) 
Lack of property interest in continued 
employment cannot defeat otherwise ac-
tionable claim that termination of employee 
violated employee's First Amendment 
rights. U.S.C.A. ConstAmends. 1, 14; 42 
U.S.C.A. § 1983. 
12. Civil Rights «=>235(3) 
Allegation that administrative employ-
ee named to trust position in Puerto Rico's 
judicial system was terminated "from his 
employment because of his close associa-
tion with [former administrative judge] 
• * * with whom defendants have personal 
and political differences" stated no cause 
of action for First Amendment violation 
under § 1983; employee did not claim that 
defendants discriminated against him on 
bas\s of his political beliefs or advocacy of 
ideas. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 1; 42 U.S. 
C.A. § 1983. 
13. Constitutional Law $=>91 
First Amendment does not protect 
against deprivations arising out of act of 
associataon unless act itself, such as joining 
church or political party, speaking out on 
CORREA-MARTINEZ v. 
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matters of public interest, or advocacy of 
reform, falls within scope of constitutional-
ly protected activities. U.S.C.A. Const. 
Amend. 1. 
14. Civil Rights *=>235(3) 
Merely juxtaposing protected charac-
teristic, such as someone else's politics, 
with fact that public employee was treated 
unfairly is not enough to state First 
Amendment claim; what is needed is a 
fact-specific showing that causal connec-
tion exists linking defendants' conduct, as 
manifested in adverse employment deci-
sion, to employee's politics. U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 1; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. 
15. International Law e»10.23 
Absent cognizable federal question, 
federal court cannot intrude upon another 
sovereign's civil service system and declare 
itself court of last resort to hear personnel 
appeals addressed to wisdom, or even good 
faith, of staffing decisions reached by 
government actors. 
16. Federal Courts e»794 
While Court of Appeals, in reviewing 
motion to dismiss for failure to state claim, 
must draw all reasonable inferences in 
plaintiffs favor, it is not obligated to credit 
every conceivable inference. Fed.Rules 
Civ.Proc.Rule 12(b)(6), 28 U.S.C.A. 
17. Federal Civil Procedure «»828, 851 
Though district court's denial of 
chance to amend complaint may constitute 
abuse of discretion if no sufficient justifica-
tion appears, district court need not grant 
every request to amend; where amend-
ment would be futile or would serve no 
legitimate purpose, district court should 
not needlessly prolong matters. Fed.Rules 
Civ.Proc.Rule 15(a), 28 U.S.C.A. 
18. Federal Civil Procedure «»851 
District court did not abuse its discre-
tion in failing to grant terminated govern-
ment employee's request for leave to 
amend civil rights complaint absent indica-
1. The defendants, appellees before us, are Hon. 
Rene Arrillaga-Belendez, a superior court judge 
and OCA's administrative director; Hon. Luis A. 
Juan-Alvarez, a superior court judge and quon-
dam administrator of the Guayama Judicial Re-
gion; and Hon. Victor M. Pons Nunez, the Chief 
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tion that employee had unearthed viable 
basis for his stated claim or that there was 
some hope for another, legally sufficient, 
claim. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 12(b)(6), 28 
U.S.C.A. 
Charles S. Hey Maestre, Rio Piedras, 
P.R., for plaintiff, appellant. 
Zuleika Llovet, Hato Rey, P.R., with 
whom Hector Rivera-Cruz, Bayamon, P.R., 
Secretary of Justice, Jorge I. Perez-Diaz, 
Sol. Gen., John F. Nevares, and Saldana, 
Rey, Moran & Alvarado, Hato Rey, P.R., 
were on brief, for defendants, appellees. 
Before BREYER, TORRUELLA and 
SELYA, Circuit Judges. 
SELYA, Circuit Judge. 
Invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), plain-
tiff-appellant Jorge Correa-Martinez (Cor-
rea) sued three jurists in federal district 
court. Asking that the judges be judged, 
Correa-Martinez alleged that he had been 
forced to resign from the judicial branch of 
Puerto Rico's government in violation of 
his due process and first amendment 
rights. The district court dismissed the 
action for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief could be granted. Fed.R. 
Civ.P. 12(b)(6). We affirm. 
I. BACKGROUND 
In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, we 
take the well-pleaded facts as they appear 
in the complaint, indulging every reason-
able inference in plaintiffs favor. See 
Dartmouth Review v. Dartmouth College, 
889 F.2d 13, 16 (1st Cir.1989); Gooley i>. 
Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 514 (1st 
Cir.1988). 
The administrative arm of the Puerto 
Rico judicial system is formally known as 
the Office of Court Administration of the 
General Court of Justice (OCA).1 There 
are two personnel classifications within the 
Justice of Puerto Rico. The two superior court 
judges were sued in their official and personal 
capacities whereas Chief Justice Pons was sued 
only as the authority "ultimately responsible for 
administration" of the court system. 
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judicial branch, Uniform Service and Cen-
tral Service. "Officers and employees of 
the Uniform Service may be suspended or 
dismissed only for just cause prior to the 
formulation of charges, and they shall have 
the right to defend themselves and be 
heard in the manner provided by law." 
P.R.Laws Ann. tit. 4, Appx. XIII, Reg. 16 
(1978) (district court's translation). In con-
trast, "[o]fficers and employees of the Cen-
tral Service, except judges, may be sus-
pended or dismissed by the Nominating 
Authority in its discretion." Id. 
Correa toiled in OCA's vineyards from 
1981 through 1988. When originally hired, 
he received an engagement letter telling 
him that he was being named to a "trust" 
position in the Central Service.2 The letter 
also warned that continued employment 
was dependent upon his "efficiency, atti-
tude, availability and compliance with the 
regulations in effect." Although he start-
ed at a lower rank, Correa served for sev-
eral years as Executive Director I, Guaya-
ma Judicial Region. He describes his func-
tions as "essentially administrative in char-
acter." His performance evaluations were 
uniformly favorable and led to a number of 
merit-related pay increases. 
Near the end of 1988, the halcyon days 
drew to a close. Judge Juan-Alvarez be-
came the interim administrator of the Gua-
yama Judicial Region and asked plaintiff to 
resign. Plaintiff complied. His resigna-
tion was officially accepted by Judge Arril-
laga-Belendez. The complaint alleges that 
defendants did not afford Correa a hearing 
and gave no reason for forcing him to quit. 
Plaintiff now attacks on two fronts. 
Contending that he possessed a "clear and 
substantial property interest" in continued 
employment at OCA, he maintains that his 
constructive discharge, unaccompanied by 
any hearing or explanation, violated proce-
dural due process. Asserting simulta-
neously that the defendants cashiered him 
because of his close association with a for-
2. In Puerto Rico, "trust" positions Cde confian-
za") are noncareer positions which do not have 
the civil service protection accorded "career" 
positions ("de permanencia"). See P.RLaws 
Ann tit. 3, §§ 1349-51 (1978) (executive 
branch). I n contrast to a 'career' employee, an 
met administrative judge, he maintains 
that his ouster ran afoul of the first amend-
ment. 
The district court found both offensives 
lacking in firepower and dismissed the com-
plaint. The court ruled that Correa, as a 
trust employee in the Central Service, had 
no property interest in his position and 
could thus be fired in the employer's discre-
tion without notice or hearing. The court 
also rejected the first amendment claim, 
stating that "[m]ere personal and political 
differences between the defendants and a 
third party . . . cannot support the allega-
tions of political discrimination against 
plaintiff." This appeal ensued. 
II. PRINCIPLES AFFECTING APPELr 
LATE REVIEW 
In the Rule 12(b)(6) milieu, an appellate 
court operates under the same constraints 
that bind the district court, that is, we may 
affirm a dismissal for failure to state a 
claim only if it clearly appears, according to 
the facts alleged, that the plaintiff cannot 
recover on any viable theory. Conley v. 
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-48, 78 S.Ct. 99, 
101-03, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Dartmouth 
Review, 889 F.2d at 16. In making that 
critical determination, we accept plaintiff's 
well-pleaded factual averments and indulge 
every reasonable inference hospitable to 
his case. Gooley, 851 F.2d at 514. 
[1] In the menagerie of the Civil Rules, 
the tiger patrolling the courthouse gates is 
rather tame, but "not entirely . . . tooth-
less." Dartmouth Review, 889 F.2d at 16. 
Despite the highly deferential reading 
which we accord a litigant's complaint un-
der Rule 12(b)(6), we need not credit bald 
assertions, periphrastic circumlocutions, 
unsubstantiated conclusions, or outright vi-
tuperation. See Chongris v. Board of Ap-
peals, 811 F.2d 36, 37 (1st Cir.), cert de-
nied, 483 U.S. 1021, 107 S.Ct. 3266, 97 
L.Ed.2d 765 (1987). Moreover, the rule 
employee of 'trust' may, under Puerto Rico law, 
be discharged at will and without cause." Rod-
riguez Rodriguez v. Munoz Munoz, 808 F.2d 138, 
140 (1st Or. 1986), accord Ruiz-Roche v. bau-
sell 848 F.2d 5, 7 (1st Cir.1988). 
CORREA-MARTINEZ v. 
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does not entitle a plaintiff to rest on "sub-
jective characterizations" or conclusory de-
scriptions of "a general scenario which 
could be dominated by unpleaded facte." 
Dewey v. Univ. of New Hampshire, 694 
F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1982), cert denied, 461 
U.S. 944, 103 S.Ct 2121, 77 L.Ed.2d 1301 
(1983). We understand that, for pleading 
purposes, the dividing line between suffi-
cient facts and insufficient conclusions "is 
often blurred." Dartmouth Review, 889 
F.2d at 16. But the line must be plotted:* 
It is only when such conclusions are logi-
cally compelled, or at least supported, by 
the stated facts, that is, when the sug-
gested inference rises to what experience 
indicates is an acceptable level of proba-
bility, that 'conclusions' become 'facts' 
for pleading purposes. 
Id. 
[2] There is another principle at work 
as well. We have frequently recognized 
that, in cases where civil rights violations 
are alleged, particular care is required to 
balance the liberality of the Civil Rules 
with the need to prevent abusive and unfair 
vexation of defendants. See, e.g., id.; 
Dewey, 694 F.2d at 3; Slotnick v. Stavis-
key, 560 F.2d 31, 33 (1st Cir.1977), cert, 
denied, 434 U.S. 1077, 98 S.Ct. 1268, 55 
L.Ed.2d 783 (1978). A civil rights com-
plaint must "outline facts sufficient to con-
vey specific instances of unlawful discrimi-
nation." Dartmouth Review, 889 F.2d at 
16. Put another way, a plaintiff may not 
prevail simply by asserting an inequity and 
tacking on the self-serving conclusion that 
the defendant was motivated by a discrimi-
natory animus. The alleged facts must 
specifically identify the particular in-
stances) of discriminatory treatment and, 
as a logical exercise, adequately support 
the thesis that the discrimination was un-
lawful. See Dartmouth Review, 889 F.2d 
at 20; see also Keyes v. Secretary of the 
Navy, 853 F.2d 1016, 1026-27 (1st Cir. 
1988); Johnson v. General Elec. Co., 840 
F.2d 132, 138 (1st Cir.1988); Springer v. 
Seaman, 821 F.2d 871, 880 (1st Cir.1987). 
3. According to the Rules of Administration of 
the Personnel System of the Judicial Branch, 
positions in the Central Service include "[posi-
tions of assistants to the executives and/or di-
ARRILLAGA-BELENDEZ 53 
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Discrimination based on unprotected char-
acteristics or garden-variety unfairness will 
not serve. 
With these precepts squarely in mind, we 
proceed to evaluate Correa's allegations. 
III. THE DUE PROCESS CLAIM 
As a prerequisite to his due process 
claim, plaintiff must demonstrate the exist-
ence of a constitutionally cognizable prop-
erty or liberty interest. See Paul v. Davis, 
424 U.S. 693, 701, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 1160, 47 
L.Ed.2d 405 (1976). Correa seeks to scale 
this hurdle by alleging that he had a prop-
erty interest in his employment. He falls 
far short. 
[3] Constitutionally protected property 
interests originate in extra-constitutional 
sources; they are "created and their dimen-
sions are defined by existing rules or 
understandings that stem from an indepen-
dent source such as state law " Board 
of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 
S.Ct. 2701, 2709, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972); 
accord Cleveland Bd. ofEduc. v. Louder-
mill, 470 U.S. 532, 538, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 
1491, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985); Bishop v. 
Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344, 96 S.Ct 2074, 
2077, 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976); Rosario-
Torres v. Hernandez-Colon, 889 F.2d 314, 
319 (1st Cir.1989) (en banc); Ruiz-Roche v. 
Lausell, 848 F.2d 5, 7 (1st Cir.1988). Here, 
plaintiff claims to derive his property inter-
est principally from the circumstances of 
his hiring. 
Correa acknowledges that OCA's en-
gagement letter notified him that he had 
been named to a trust position in the Cen-
tral Service.1 He also concedes that Cen-
tral Service employees are subject to dis-
missal at the employer's discretion. See 
P.R.Laws Ann. tit. 4, Appx. XIII, Reg. 16. 
These verities notwithstanding, Correa ar-
gues that the written confirmation of his 
particular appointment "tempered" the 
ramifications normally attendant to the 
post. In this respect, he points out that the 
recting officers . . . which because of their func-
tions require personal trust." P.R.Laws Ann. tit. 
4, Appx. XII, Rule 4(l)(c) (plaintiffs transla-
tion). 
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engagement letter admonished that "your 
permanency in the [position] will depend 
upon your efficiency, attitude, disposition 
and . . . compliance with regulations in ef-
fect" from time to time. Plaintiff suggests 
that OCA thereby limited its discretion, 
granting him job security so long as he 
fulfilled these few written conditions. 
Appellant's thesis boils down to the idea 
that the engagement letter ex proprio trig-
ore comprised an independent source for a 
legitimate expectation of continued employ-
ment, and hence, for a property interest. 
We give Correa high marks for ingenuity 
but a failing grade in persuasion. The 
engagement letter clearly informed plain-
tiff that he was being hired to a trust 
position. He accepted the characterization 
then—and must accept it now. Trust em-
ployees may be freely dismissed in the dis-
cretion of the nominating authority (here, 
OCA); indeed, the very essence of trust 
positions is their lack of permanency. See, 
e.g., Ruiz-Roche, 848 F.2d at 7. So, plain-
tiffs construct has force only if, and to the 
extent that, the personnel director could 
effectively limit OCA's statutory powers by 
adopting terms and conditions outside of, 
and flatly inconsistent with, the legislative-
ly mandated criteria. This is a Houdini-in-
reverse argument, which assumes that a 
government employer can be securely 
locked into a box that the legislature has 
purposely left wide open. We find alto-
gether untenable the notion that civil ser-
vice laws can so nimbly be sidestepped. 
We have regularly held that, under Puer-
to Rico law, government employees hired 
illegally to permanent or career positions 
are neither invested with property interests 
in continued employment nor entitled to the 
due process protections which inure to their 
legally hired counterparts. See Rosario-
Torres, 889 F.2d at 319; de Feliciano v. de 
Jesus, 873 F.2d 447, 452-55 (1st Cir,), cert. 
denied, — U.S. , 110 S.Ct 148, 107 
L.Ed.2d 107 (1989); Santiago-Negron v. 
Castro-Davila, 865 F.2d 431, 436-37 (1st 
Cir.1989); Kauffman v. Puerto Rico Tele-
* Judge Torruella continues to believe that this 
line of authority is wrongly decided, see Rosar> 
io-Torres, 889 F.2d at 325-26 (Torruella, J., dis-
senting), and in any event, is of the opinion that 
phone Co., 841 F.2d 1169, 1173 (1st Cir. 
1988).* In those cases, the plaintiffs were 
hired in violation of the Puerto Rico Per-
sonnel Act or some other recruitment pro-
tocol. See, e.g., Rosario-Torres, 889 F.2d 
at 319. Notwithstanding that the fault 
was entirely the nominating authority's, we 
ruled that an employer's "failure to abide 
by the rules when [employees] were hired 
. . . has nothing to do with . . . whether or 
not Puerto Rico law gave the plaintiffs a 
sufficient 'property interest* in their jobs as 
to invoke the protection of the Fourteenth 
Amendment" de Feliciano, 873 F.2d at 
454; see also Franco v. Municipality of 
Cidra, 113 D.P.R. 334, 337 (1982) (munici-
pality's "decisions and actions, which were 
contrary to and incompatible with the Per-
sonnel Act, lacked sufficient legal force to 
create and ratify a career position and ap-
pointment that was essentially a confiden-
tial position"); Colon-Perez v. Mayor of 
Municipality ofCeiba, 112 D.P.R. 934, 940 
(1982) (same). 
Unless we are prepared to abandon the 
rationale of this line of cases, it must fol-
low that OCA's personnel director could 
not effectively confer a property interest 
on plaintiff merely by making statements 
contrary to the Commonwealth's extensive 
statutory/regulatory framework anent 
government employment. Cf. Goyco de 
Maldonado v. Rivera, 849 F.2d 683, 688 
(1st Cir.1988) (government employer may 
not insulate employment decisions from 
constitutional scrutiny "by the relatively 
simple expedient of passing a rule or enact-
ing a by-law"). In Puerto Rico, an incom-
ing administration has a legislatively as-
sured right to fill jobs implicating the em-
ployer's confidence or trust with persons of 
the administration's choosing. We do not 
believe that this right can be subjected to 
casual deprivation or that the legislature's 
will can so easily be thwarted. Indeed, 
were plaintiffs general argument to pre-
vail, the carefully thought-out civil service 
system could easily be wrecked by mid-ech-
present reliance on the same is unnecessary to 
decide the issues raised by this appeal. He 
therefore disassociates himself from this por-
tion of the opinion. 
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to their own ends. 
To be sure, an employer's unilateral dec-
larations, promises, or conduct regarding 
conditions of continued employment might 
in some circumstances create a 'legitimate 
claim of entitlement to job tenure." Perry 
v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602, 92 S.Ct. 
2694, 2700, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972). In Per-
ry, for example, the Court held that a 
professor should have been given an oppor-
tunity to prove his claim that he had devel-
oped a property interest under the college's 
unwritten "de facto " tenure program. Id 
at 603, 92 S.Ct at 2700. The Court noted 
that the "absence of . . . an explicit contrac-
tual provision may not always foreclose the 
possibility that a teacher has a 'property' 
interest in re-employment," especially 
where the employer's practices or represen-
tations supplement other, explicit contrac-
tual provisions. Id at 601-02, 92 S.Ct. at 
2699-2700; see also Cheveras Pacheco v. 
Rivera Gonzalez, 809 F.2d 125, 127 (1st 
Cir.1987) (recognizing that interstitial or 
supplemental representations might create 
constitutionally protectable property inter-
ests). 
[4] The Perry rule depends, of course, 
on perforation, that is, on pockets of uncer-
tainty. Where an employment scheme— 
whether statutory, contractual, or mixed— 
is silent on specific points, pocked with 
fissures, or infected by a serious strain of 
ambiguity, an employer's conduct or decla-
rations may quite appropriately be used to 
fill the gaps. In the case at bar, however, 
there were no gaps to fill. The written 
assurances given to plaintiff, to the extent 
they can be interpreted to mean what plain-
tiff says they mean (a matter as to which 
we take no view), stand in direct contraven-
tion of a comprehensive network of statu-
tory and regulatory directives governing 
the terms of Central Service employment 
and trust positions generally. It would 
rock the foundations of that system to rely 
on the arguably contradictory terms of a 
personnel director's welcoming missive to 
4. Correa's case, we might add, is considerably 
less compelling than the cited cases in that, 
unlike the employees in, say, Rosario-Torres, 
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supervene the letter of law. Thus, the 
engagement letter could not and did not 
create a cognizable property interest in the 
Executive Director I position. Cf Ruiz-
Roche, 848 F.2d at 8 (government employ-
er's naked promise of future career em-
ployment insufficient to create property in-
terest on part of trust employee). 
[5,6] There is yet another base to be' 
touched. Both apart from, and in concert 
with, the engagement letter, Correa also 
argues his due process claim in terms of 
"fundamental fairness." We are not un-
sympathetic to his plea. Plaintiff served 
the judicial branch well for seven years. 
He toiled under four administrative judges, 
none of whom ever questioned his trust-
worthiness or competence. In short, tak-
ing the complaint at face value, he did 
nothing wrong. Be that as it may, length 
of employment and good behavior, in and 
of themselves, customarily do not create a 
property interest in continued employment. 
See Perry, 408 U.S. at 601-02, 92 S.Ct. at 
2699-2700; Bollow i>. Fed. Reserve Bank 
of San Francisco, 650 F.2d 1093, 1099 (9th 
Cir.1981), cert denied, 455 U.S. 948, 102 
S.Ct. 1449, 71 L.Ed.2d 662 (1982). That 
plaintiff claims to have performed mainly 
administrative duties is beside the point; 
what matters, in the due process context, is 
the legislative classification of Correa's po-
sition as one of trust in the Central Service. 
[7,8] As in the cases where employees 
were assigned career positions in an irregu-
lar manner and had good reason to believe 
that their positions were secure, plaintiffs 
subjective expectancies cannot override the 
unambiguous commands of the civil service 
laws. Without some legal source other 
than a superior officer's unilateral and/or 
unauthorized actions contrary to Puerto 
Rico law, a government worker's preten-
sions to a constitutionally cognizable prop-
erty right in his employment must be 
turned aside. See Rosario-Torres, 889 
F.2d at 316; de Feliciano, 873 F.2d at 
453-55; Santiago-Negron, 865 F.2d at 
436; Kauffman, 841 F.2d at 1173.4 
S89 F.2d at 316, Correa was clearly informed 
from the beginning that his position was one of 
trust within the Central Service. Moreover, the 
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[9] Plaintiff tries unsuccessfully to bol-
ster his due process claim by pointing to 
the Regulations of Administration of the 
Personnel System of the Judicial Branch, 
specifically RR.Laws Ann. tit 4, Appx. 
XIII, Reg. 2 (employees "shall receive just 
and equitable treatment, without discrimi-
nation of any type based on race, creed, 
color, sex, social condition or political affil-
iation") (plaintiffs translation). Without 
an adequate allegation of discrimination 
based on plaintiffs political affiliation, see 
infra Part IV, the regulation is simply not 
in play. Nor can the other, arguably am-
biguous, regulatory language to which Cor-
rea alludes, e.g., P.R.Laws Ann. tit. 4, 
Appx. XIII, Reg. 3, be construed to contra-
dict the fundamental merit principle embod-
ied in Puerto Rico's extensive public em-
ployment scheme. 
[10] To say more would be to paint the 
lily. Because the plaintiff has not alleged 
facts sufficient to support a reasonable ex-
pectation of, or recognizable property inter-
est in, continued government employment, 
defendants were not constitutionally re-
quired to afford him any process before 
ending his OCA service. Insofar as the 
motion to dismiss addressed the due pro-
cess claim, it was properly granted.5 
IV. THE FIRST AMENDMENT CLAIM 
[11] The foregoing explication does not 
entirely settle matters. Correa also con-
tends that his first amendment rights were 
abridged. That statement of claim, if oth-
erwise actionable, cannot be defeated by 
the lack of a property interest See Branti 
fact that superiors had not exercised their dis-
cretion to dismiss an at-will employee does not 
normally preclude them from changing their 
mind, nor does it preclude a new superior offi-
cer from exercising the prerogative. 
5. Although plaintiffs complaint mentions sub-
stantive due process as well as procedural due 
process, he does not press the former point on 
appeal. In view of "the settled appellate rule 
that issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, 
unaccompanied by some effort at developed ar-
gumentation, are deemed waived," United States 
v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir.1990), we 
omit any discussion of substantive due process. 
6. We use the term "nonpolicymakers," perhaps 
inartfully, as a shorthand reference to those 
v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 512 n. 6, 100 S.Ct. 
1287, 1291 n. 6, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980); 
Santiago-Negron, 865 F.2d at 436; Chev-
eras Pacheco, 809 F.2d at 128. As the 
Court has taught: 
[E]ven though a person has no 'right' to 
a valuable governmental benefit and 
even though the government may deny 
him the benefit for any number of rea-
sons, there are some reasons upon which 
the government may not rely. 
Perry, 408 U.S. at 597, 92 S.Ct. at 2697. 
[12] The crux of the first amendment 
initiative is the allegation that the defen-
dants "were motivated by their discrimina-
tory intent to terminate plaintiff from his 
employment because of his close associa-
tion with [the former administrative judge] 
. . . with whom defendants have personal 
and political differences/' The district 
court held that no cause of action was 
stated. We agree. 
At a bare minimum, plaintiffs burden at 
the pleading stage was to allege facts 
which, if proven, would demonstrate that 
his forced resignation was brought about 
by discrimination on the basis of some con-
stitutionally safeguarded interest. See 
Branti, 445 U.S. at 515, 517, 100 S.Ct. at 
1293, 1294; ML Healthy City Bd. ofEduc. 
v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287, 97 S.Ct. 568, 
576, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977); Cordero v. de 
Jesus-Mendez, 867 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir.1989). 
The Supreme Court has held that the first 
amendment protects nonpolicymakers from 
being drummed out of public service on the 
basis of their political affiliation or advoca-
cy of ideas.* See Branti, 445 U.S. at 517, 
instances where, because the affected employees 
are neither "involved in policymaking, the com-
munication of political ideas, or sensitive tasks 
connected with the policymaking function/' 
Vazquez Rios v. Hernandez Colon, 819 F.2d 319, 
322 (1st Cir.1987), nor "occupy[ing] positions of 
. . . unusually intimate propinquity to govern-
ment leaders," id. at 324, partisan affiliation is 
an inappropriate job criterion. Inasmuch as 
Correa has not alleged facts sufficient to permit 
a finding that a constitutionally sacrosanct in-
terest was transgressed, see infra, we need not 
decide whether political loyalty was a permissi-
ble requirement for the position that he held. 
For the same reason, we have no occasion to 
reach appellant's contention that this case dif-
fered from other public employment cases be-
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100 S.Ct at 1294 (dismissals actionable if 
plaintiffs "were discharged 'solely for the 
reason that they were not affiliated with or 
sponsored by [a particular] Party'") (cita-
tion omitted); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 
347, 357, 96 S.Ct 2673, 2681, 49 L.Ed.2d 
547 (1976) (plurality op.) (first amendment 
protects "freedom to associate with others 
for the common advancement of political 
beliefs and ideas"); cf. Perry, 408 U.S. at 
597-98, 92 S.Ct at 2697-98 (government 
"may not deny a benefit to a person on a 
basis that infringes his constitutionally pro-
tected interests—especially, his interest in 
freedom of speech"). We have myriad 
cases in the same mold. See, e.g., Agosto 
de Feliciano v. Aponte-Roque, 889 F.2d 
1209, 1212 n. 1 (1st Cir.1989) (en banc) 
(setting forth partial listing); Rosario-
Torres, 889 F.2d at 315 (similar). The case 
at bar is at a further remove. 
Here, plaintiff does not allege that his 
politics, his ideology, or his advocacy of 
political goals led to his downfall. The 
complaint is altogether silent as to whether 
Correa had any partisan affiliation or es-
poused any controversial political views. It 
does not say if, or how, Correa's affil-
iations or views differed from those of the 
incumbent judges. Refined to bare es-
sence, then, plaintiff does not claim that 
defendants discriminated against him on 
the basis of his political beliefs or advocacy 
of ideas—discrimination which would impli-
cate an interest shielded by the Bill of 
Rights. Rather, he asserts only that defen-
dants had "personal and political differ-
ences" with an unrelated individual, Judge 
Padilla (the jurist formerly in charge of the 
Guayama Judicial Region), and discrimi-
nated against him (plaintiff) because of his 
"close association" with Judge Padilla. We 
do not think that such discrimination, if it 
existed, impinged upon a constitutionally 
protected right 
cause he was an employee of the judicial branch 
of government. No matter how tantalizing is-
sues may appear, courts must be reluctant to 
plunge headlong into uncharted decisional wa-
ters where no need exists. 
7. Appellant has not claimed that, although he 
was in fact nonpolitical, defendants forced him 
to resign because they (mistakenly) thought he 
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[13] Various relationships have been 
sheltered under the capacious constitution-
al tent of freedom of association. See, e.g., 
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429-30, 
83 S.Ct 328, 335-36, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963) 
(first amendment protects "vigorous advo-
cacy" and right "to engage in association 
for the advancement of beliefs and ideas"), 
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460, 78 
S.Ct. 1163,1171, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958) (Bill 
of Rights safeguards "beliefs sought to be 
advanced by association [which] pertain to 
political, economic, religious or cultural 
matters"). Nevertheless, it is clear that, in 
constitutional terms, freedom of associa-
tion is not to be defined unreservedly. En-
try into the constitutional orbit requires 
more than a mere relationship. The Consti-
tution may be interposed as a barrier to 
state action only to the extent that the 
targeted association is characterizable in 
terms of some particular constitutional con-
cern. See United States v. Comley, 890 
F.2d 539, 544 (1st Cir.1989); see also L. 
Tribe, American Constitutional Law 
§ 12-23, at 702-03 (1978). Put another 
way, the first amendment does not protect 
against all deprivations arising out of an 
act of association unless the act itself—say, 
joining a church or a political party, speak-
ing out on matters of public interest, advo-
cacy of reform—falls within the scope of 
activities eligible for inclusion within the 
constitutional tent. 
Analyzed in this light, Correa's complaint 
was vulnerable to a motion to dismiss. The 
complaint did not say that plaintiff pos-
sessed, or expressed, any significant politi-
cal views; indeed, implicit in plaintiffs ar-
guments is the suggestion that he, himself, 
scrupulously avoided partisan political in-
volvement7 The complaint contained no 
facts regarding the political contours, if 
any, of Correa's relationship with Judge 
was a member of the opposition party. We 
express no opinion, therefore, on whether a 
discharge which arises not out of an employee's 
political activity, but out of the government em-
ployer's belief, wrongly held, that the employee 
was in league with the opposition party, would 
be actionable under the rubric of the first 
amendment. 
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Padilla. It contained no facts capable of 
supporting an inference that the relation-
ship came within the constitutional orbit. 
It did not maintain that defendants knew 
anything about plaintiffs politics or that 
their motivation related in the slightest to 
plaintiffs exercise of any first amendment 
or other constitutionally protected right. 
This deficit, we suggest, leaves a chas-
mal gap—one not bridged by plaintiffs 
bald assertion that defendants construc-
tively discharged him due to his relation-
ship with Judge Padilla. At most, the com-
plaint might support an inference that poli-
tics was in the air between defendants and 
Judge Padilla. Nevertheless, a politically 
charged atmosphere of that sort, without 
more, provided no basis for a reasonable 
inference that defendants' employment de-
cisions about plaintiff were tainted by 
their disregard of plaintiffs first amend-
ment rights. Cf Dartmouth Review, 889 
F.2d at 16 ("smoke alone is not enough to 
force the defendants to a trial to prove that 
their actions were not . . . discriminatory") 
(citation omitted). Absent a constitutional-
ly protected aspect, a "close relationship" 
with a third party is insufficient to invoke 
the prophylaxis of the Elrod-Branti rule, 
notwithstanding that consideration of the 
third party's political beliefs may have 
entered into the decisionmaking calculus. 
[14] Of course, plaintiff tells us that 
political association is the protected charac-
teristic, but that approach, too, rings hol-
low. Merely juxtaposing a protected char-
acteristic—someone else's politics—with 
the fact that plaintiff was treated unfairly 
is not enough to state a constitutional 
claim. See Dartmouth Review, 889 F.2d 
at 19; see also Medina-Munoz v. R.J. 
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 9 (1st 
Cir.1990) (in age discrimination case, plain-
tiff must show a discriminatory animus 
based on his age); White v. Vathally, 732 
F.2d 1037, 1042-43 (1st Cir.) (similar; Title 
VII), cert denied, 469 U.S. 933, 105 S.Ct 
831, 83 LEd.2d 267 (1984); Jafree v. Bar-
ber, 689 F.2d 640, 643 (7th Cir.1982) (factu-
al allegations must show that protected 
quality "was the reason for dismissal"). 
What is needed is a fact-specific showing 
that a causal connection exists linking de-
fendants' conduct, as manifested in the ad-
verse employment decision, to plaintiffs 
politics, that is, the plaintiff must have pled 
facts adequate to raise a plausible infer-
ence that he was subjected to discrimina-
tion based on his political affiliation or 
views. No such facts were marshalled 
here. 
[15] We make one final observation. 
We do not suggest that if, as plaintiff 
would have it, defendants chose to jettison 
a competent, hardworking employee be-
cause of his loyalty, real or imagined, to a 
former superior, the court system would be 
well served or fairness achieved. But that 
is not the point. In the absence of a cogni-
zable federal question, a federal court can-
not intrude upon another sovereign's civil 
service system and declare itself a court of 
last resort to hear personnel appeals ad-
dressed to the wisdom, or even the good 
faith, of staffing decisions reached by the 
government actors. Cf, e.g., Freeman v. 
Package Machinery Co., 865 F.2d 1331, 
1341 (1st Cir.1988) (Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act "does not stop a company 
from discharging an employee for any rea-
son (fair or unfair) or for no reason, so 
long as the decision to fire does not stem 
from the person's age"); Gray v. New 
England Telephone and Telegraph Co., 
792 F.2d 251, 255 (1st Cir.1986) (civil rights 
laws do not forestall cashiering an employ-
ee "arbitrarily or with ill will," absent pro-
hibited discrimination). 
[16] We have said enough. While Rule 
12(b)(6) requires deference to the well-
pleaded allegations of plaintiffs complaint, 
we are not obligated to give free rein to 
imagination. See Gooley, 851 F.2d at 514 
("court need not conjure up unpled allega-
tions or contrive elaborately arcane 
scripts"). Although we must draw all rea-
sonable inferences in plaintiff's favor, we 
are not obligated to credit every conceiva-
ble inference. See Gray, 792 F.2d at 256 
^"unreasonable and speculative inferences" 
cannot be allowed to bottom a civil rights 
action). The evenhanded application of 
these principles necessitates that we affirm 
the ruling that plaintiffs complaint failed 
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to state an actionable fii st amendment 
claim, 
V. THE REQUEST TO AMEND 
After defendants moved to dismiss in the 
district court, plaintiff had an opportunity 
to amend his complaint as of right.8 Es-
chewing such a course, plaintiff instead 
opposed the motion arid inserted in his op-
position a request that he be allowed to file 
an amended complaint if the 'motion was 
granted. The district court never acted on 
the request. Correa now portrays this 
omission as an abuse of the court's; discre-
tion. 
[171 Because leave to amend "shall be 
freely given when justice so requires," Fed. 
R Civ.P 15(a), a district court's denial of a 
chance to amend may constitute an abuse 
of discretion if no sufficient justification 
appears, See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 
178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 230, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 
(1962). On the other hand, a district court 
need not grant every request to amend, 
come what may. See Aoude v. Mobil Oil 
Corp., 892 F.2d 1115, 1121 (1st Cir.1989); 
Quaker State Oil Refining Corp. v. Gam-
iy Oil Co., 884 F.2d 1510, 1517-18 (1st 
Cir.1989). Where an amendment would be 
futile or would serve no legitimate purpose, 
the district court should not needlessly pro-
long matters. See Foman, 371 U.S. at 182, 
83 S.Ct at 230. For aught that appears, 
this case is in that vein. 
We have examined the amendments sug 
gested in plaintiffs opposition to the mo-
tion to dismiss and in his appellate brief. 
We find nothing of decretory significance, 
that is, nothing which would repair the 
8. A party may amend "once as a matter of 
course at any time before a responsive pleading 
is served." Fed.RXiv.P. 15(a). Inasmuch as 
defendants' dismissal motion did not constitute 
a responsive pleading, see Dartmouth Review, 
889 F.2d at 22; McDonald v. Hall 579 F2d 120, 
121 (1st Cir.1978), plaintiff was not required to 
seek leave to amend. 
9. "We note in passing that plaintiff offhandedly 
inserted the conditional request to amend in his 
opposition below and did not renew it after the 
district court ruled. He may very well have 
waived the point. See generally Dartmouth Re 
view, 889 F.2d at 22 ("In this circuit, 'it is a 
party's first obligation to seel any relief that 
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holes in Correa's case, For example, plain 
tiff offered to submit the unexpurgated 
text of the engagement letter, but there is 
no indication that any statements other 
than the excerpts already contained in the 
complaint would be relevant. Plaintiff also 
offered several sworn statements substan-
tiating what the complaint already alleged 
about plaintiffs excellent work record, the 
nature of his duties, and OCA's wonted 
personnel practices. These submissions 
would plainly have been superfluous; the 
well-pleaded allegations of the complaint, 
without buttressing, were taken as true for 
purposes of defendants' Rule 12(bX6) mo-
tion. See supra Part II and cases cited. 
Moreover, as we have explained at some 
length, this case is not about the essential 
justness of defendants' decision to oust 
plaintiff from his governmental post; it is 
about the presence or absence of a claim 
cognizable under 'the federal Constitution 
and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 
[18] Having culled plaintiffs represen-
tations as to what he might in good faith 
be able to allege, we are satisfied that this 
is an instance where "the 'new' facts are of 
the same genre as the 'old' facts " 
Dartmouth Review, 889 F.2d at 23. With-
out any indication that plaintiff had un-
earthed a viable basis for his stated claim, 
or that there was some hope for another 
(legally sufficient) claim, the court below 
'did not abuse its discretion in failing to 
grant Correa's request for leave to amend f 
V I . C O N C L U S I O N ; .;. •.. 
To recapitulate, plaintiff has failed to 
demonstrate anything more than a unilater-
might fairly have been thought available in the 
district court before seeking it on appeal.'") 
(quoting Beaulieu v. United States Internal Reve-
nue Service, 865 F.2d 1351, 1352 (1st Cir.1989)); 
Rivera-Gomez v. de Castro, 843 F.2d 631, 635-36 
(1st Cir.1988) ("When in the ordinary case, 'the 
pleader has stood upon his pleading and appeal-
ed from a judgment of dismissal, amendment 
will not ordinarily be permitted . . . if the dis-
missal is affirmed.'") (citation omitted); cf. 
James v. Watt, 716 F.2d 71, 77-78 (1st Cir.1983), 
cert, denied, 467 US. 1209, 104 S.Ct. 2397, 81 
LEd.2d 354 (1984). We have elected, however, 
to address the question frontally. 
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al expectation of continued employment at 
OCA. While he may or may not have been 
treated fairly, we find nothing in the record 
which might demonstrate that he had a 
property interest in his job or that con-
structive discharge was offensive to the 
Constitution. Plaintiffs first amendment 
claim, which pivots not on his politics but 
on the persona and politics of a third party, 
will not wash. And because Correa's prof-
fered amendments were designed to ampli-
fy substantively defective statements of 
claim rather than to repair the defects, 
there was no good reason to allow the 
filing of an amended complaint. 
We need go no further. Correa's suit 
was appropriately dismissed. The order 
and judgment below must therefore be 
Affirmed, 
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Circuit Judge. 
SELYA, Circuit Judge. 
This case requires us, for the first time, 
to explore the interstices and margins of 
the Court's opinion in Griffin v. Wiscon-
sin, 483 U.S. 868, 107 S.Ct 3164, 97 
L.Ed.2d 709 (1987). Having completed this 
journey into fourth amendment jurispru-
dence, we hold that a parolee may be ar-
rested in his own home by a police officer 
not possessing a judicial warrant when the 
police officer acts in good faith at the re-
quest of parole authorities who, in accord-
ance with a parole regulation, have found 
reasonable cause to order the individual's 
detention as a suspected parole violator. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Defendant-appellant Edward Cardona, 
previously convicted of a felony in New 
York, was on parole in Rhode Island pursu-
ant to an interstate parole compact. After 
defendant's Rhode Island parole officer re-
ported problems, a parole violation warrant 
(PVW) was issued by the New York parole 
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FOMAN v. DAVIS, EXECUTRIX. 
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 
THE FIRST CIRCUIT. 
No 41 Argued November 14, 1962—Decided December 3, 1962 
A Federal Distnct Court dismissed petitioner's complaint in a civil 
action for failure to state a claim upon which relief might be 
granted Petitioner promptly moved to vacate the judgment and 
amend the complaint so as to state an alternative theory for 
recovery Before the Court ruled on those motions, petitioner filed 
notice of appeal from the judgment of dismissal Subsequentl>, the 
Distnct Court denied the motions to vacate the judgment and 
to amend the complaint, and petitioner filed notice of appeal from 
that denial On appeal, the parties briefed and argued the ments 
of both the dismissal of the complaint and the denial of petitioner's 
motions The Court of Appeals treated the first notice of appeal 
as premature, because of the then pending motion to vacate, and 
it dismissed that appeal It held that the second notice of appeal 
was ineffective to review the judgment of dismissal, because it 
failed to specify that the appeal *as from that judgment, and it 
affirmed denial of petitioner's motions, on the ground that there 
was nothing in the record to support a finding that the Distnct 
Court had abused its discretion in refusing to allo\s amendment 
of the complaint Held • 
1 On the record in this case, the Court of Appeals erred m 
narrow 1> reading the second notice of appeal as applying only to 
the denial of petitioner's motions, since petitioner's intention to 
seek review of both the dismissal of the complaint and the denial of 
her motions was manifest from the record as a whole Pp 181-182 
2 The Court of Appeals also erred in affirming the Distnct 
Court's denial of petitioner's motion to vacate the judgment of 
dismissal in order to allow amendment of the complaint, since it 
appears from the record that the amendment uould have done no 
more than state an alternative theory of recovery, Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 15 (a) declares that leave to amend "shall be 
freely given when justice so requires," and denial of the motion 
without an> apparent justifying reason uas an abuse of discretion 
P 182 
292 F. 2d 85, reversed. 
FOMAN v. DAVIS. 179 
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Milton Bordwin argued the cause and filed briefs for 
petitioner. 
Roland E. Shaine argued the cause for respondent. 
With him on the briefs was Richard R, Caples. 
MR. JUSTICE GOLDBERG delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
Petitioner filed a complaint in the District Court alleg-
ing that, in exchange for petitioner's promise to care for 
and support her mother, petitioner's father had agreed 
not to make a will, thereby assuring petitioner of an intes-
tate share of the father's estate; it was further alleged 
that petitioner had fully performed her obligations under 
the oral agreement, but that contrary thereto the father 
had devised his property to respondent, his second wrife 
and executrix. Petitioner sought recovery of what would 
have been her intestate share of the father's estate. Re-
spondent moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground 
that the oral agreement was unenforceable under the 
applicable state statute of frauds. Accepting respondent's 
contention, the District Court entered judgment on De-
cember 19, 1960, dismissing petitioner's complaint for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief might be granted. 
On December 20, 1960, petitioner filed motions to vacate 
the judgment and to amend the complaint to assert a 
right of recovery in quantum meruit for performance 
of the obligations which were the consideration for the 
assertedly unenforceable oral contract. On January 17, 
1961, petitioner filed a notice of appeal from the judgment 
of December 19,1960. On January 23,1961, the District 
Court denied petitioner's motions to vacate the judgment 
and to amend the complaint. On January 26,1961, peti-
tioner filed a notice of appeal from denial of the motions. 
On appeal, the parties briefed and argued the merits 
of dismissal of the complaint and denial of petitioner's 
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motions by the District Court. Notwithstanding, the 
Court of Appeals of its own accord dismissed the appeal 
insofar as taken from the District Court judgment of 
December 1$, 1960, and affirmed the orders of the District 
Court entered January 23, 1961. 292 F. 2d 85. This 
Court granted certiorari. 368 U. S. 951. 
The Court of Appeals reasoned that in the absence of 
a specific designation of the provision of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure under which the December 20, 1960, 
motion to vacate was filed, the motion would be treated 
as filed pursuant to Rule 59 (e), rather than under Rule 
60 (b) ; 1 since, under Rule 73 (a),2 a motion under Rule 
59 suspends the running of time within which an appeal 
may be perfected, the first notice of appeal was treated 
as premature in view of the then pending motion to vacate 
and of no effect. The Court of Appeals held the second 
notice of appeal, filed January 26, 1961, ineffective to 
review the December 19, 1960, judgment dismissing the 
complaint because the notice failed to specify that the 
appeal was being taken from that judgment as well as 
*Rule 59(e) provides: 
"A motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be served not later 
than 10 days after entry of the judgment." 
Rule 60 (b) provides in relevant part: 
"On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve 
a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or 
proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, sur-
prise, or excusable neglect . . . or (6) any other reason justifying 
relief from the operation of the judgment. . . . A motion under this 
subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend 
its operation. . . ." 
2
 Rule 73 (a) provides in relevant part: 
"The running of the time for appeal is terminated by a timely motion 
made pursuant to any of the rules hereinafter enumerated, and the 
full time for appeal fixed in this subdivision commences to run and is 
to be computed from the entry of any of the following orders made 
upon a timely motion under such rules . . . granting or denying a 
motion under Rule 59 to alter or amend the judgment . . . ." 
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from the orders denying the motions. Considering the 
second notice of appeal, therefore, only as an appeal from 
the denial by the District Court of the motions to vacate 
and amend, the Court of Appeals held that there was 
nothing in the record to show the circumstances which 
were before the District Court for consideration in ruling 
on those motions; consequently it regarded itself as pre-
cluded from finding any abuse of discretion in the refusal 
of the court below to allow amendment. 
The Court of Appeals' treatment of the motion to va-
cate as one under Rule 59 (e) was permissible, at least as 
an original matter, and we will accept that characteriza-
tion here. Even if this made the first notice of appeal 
premature, we must nonetheless reverse for we believe the 
Court of Appeals to have been in error in so narrowly 
reading the second notice. 
The defect in the second notice of appeal did not mis-
lead or prejudice the respondent. With both notices of 
appeal before it (even granting the asserted ineffective-
ness of the first), the Court of Appeals should have 
treated the appeal from the denial of the motions as an 
effective, although inept, attempt to appeal from the judg-
ment sought to be vacated. Taking the two notices and 
the appeal papers together, petitioner's intention to seek 
review of both the dismissal and the denial of the motions 
was manifest. Not only did both parties brief and argue 
the merits of the earlier judgment on appeal, but peti-
tioner's statement of points on which she intended to 
rely on appeal, submitted to both respondent and the 
court pursuant to rule, similarly demonstrated the intent 
to challenge the dismissal. 
It is too late in the day and entirely contrary to the 
spirit of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for deci-
sions on the merits to be avoided on the basis of such mere 
technicalities. "The Federal Rules reject the approach 
that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by 
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counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the 
principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a 
proper decision on the merits.,, Conley v. Gibson, 355 
U. S. 41,48. The Rules themselves provide that they are 
to be construed "to secure the just, speedy, and inexpen-
sive determination of every action." Rule 1. 
The Court of Appeals also erred in affirming the District 
Court's denial of petitioner's motion to vacate the judg-
ment in order to allow amendment of the complaint. As 
appears from the record, the amendment would have done 
no more than state an alternative theory for recovery. 
Rule 15 (a) declares that leave to amend "shall be 
freely given when justice so requires"; this mandate is 
to be heeded. See generally, 3 Moore, Federal Practice 
(2d ed. 1948), ffil 15.08, 15.10. If the underlying facts or 
circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper 
subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity 
to test his claim on the merits. In the absence of any 
apparent or declared reason—such as undue delay, bad 
faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, re-
peated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments pre-
viously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party 
by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of 
amendment, etc.—the leave sought should, as the rules 
require, be "freely given." Of course, the grant or denial 
of an opportunity to amend is within the discretion of 
the District Court, but outright refusal to grant the leave 
without any justifying reason appearing for the denial is 
not an exercise of discretion; it is merely abuse of that 
discretion and inconsistent with the spirit of the Federal 
Rules. 
The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded 
to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
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Separate memorandum of MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, in 
which MR. JUSTICE WHITE joins. 
I agree with the Court as to the dismissal of petitioner's 
appeal by the Court of Appeals. However, as to her 
motion to vacate the order of the District Court and for 
leave to amend the" complaint, I believe such matters are 
best left with the Courts of Appeals, and I would dismiss 
the writ of certiorari, in that respect, as improvidently 
granted. 
368 868 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
conclusion is the same as the one that we 
advance here: 
[T]he court finds that federal statutes 
and regulations pertaining to an inter-
state carrier's use of nonowned equip-
ment do not render the carrier or its 
insurer exclusively liable for personal in-
juries or property damage sustained in 
an accident involving such equipment 
Instead, federal law, as interpreted by 
the Tenth Circuit, imposes liability on all 
insurers who are obligated to provide 
some type of coverage for damage pur-
suant to the terms of their policies and 
any endorsements thereto. Under feder-
al law, the insurer of an ICC-licensed 
carrier is required to provide primary 
coverage for any final judgment obtained 
against the carrier. However, the mere 
fact that an interstate carrier is involved 
does not absolve other insurers from 
their obligations under other policies 
which are applicable to the claims. 
Id at 569. 
[7,8] We are in complete agreement 
with the district court in American Gener-
al, and adopt its reasoning: 
[T]here is no reason that state laws or 
private agreements should not be able to 
allocate ultimate financial responsibility 
in such a situation. Nor does public poli-
cy dictate that insurers of truck owners 
be absolved from risks they voluntarily 
assumed solely because the vehicle was 
leased to an interstate carrier. 
Id. at 565 (citations omitted). Similarly, 
Empire may not escape liability that would 
otherwise be primary simply because Guar-
anty's policy contains an ICC endorsement 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In summary, we hold that the effect of 
the ICC endorsement in Guaranty's policy 
is to negate limiting language in the body 
of the policy, including any applicable "ex-
cess coverage" clause, but that the en-
dorsement does not makes Guaranty's poli-
cy necessarily primary and supreme over 
Empire's policy. Rather, once limiting lan-
guage is read out of Guaranty's policy, the 
two policies then must be compared pursu-
ant to traditional state insurance and con-
tract law principles to determine how liabil-
ity should be allocated. Accordingly, we 
VACATE the summary judgment and RE-
MAND for a determination of how the 
risks should be allocated between Guaranty 
and Empire when all the provisions of both 
policies, including the ICC endorsement, 
are considered. 
Bonnie GLENN and Glenn's Enterprises 
Inc., a Colorado Corporation, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v. 
FIRST NATIONAL BANK IN GRAND 
JUNCTION, a Federal Banking Institu-
tion, Allen E. Heimer, Wayne Beede, 
and Carol Rodgers, Defendants-Appel-
lees. 
No. 87-1312. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Tenth Circuit. 
Feb. 15, 1989. 
Action was brought alleging RICO vio-
lation. The United States District Court 
for the District of Colorado, Jim R. Carri-
gan, J., granted defendants' motion to dis-
miss, and appeal was taken. The Court of 
Appeals, Brorby, Circuit Judge, held that 
(1) district court was not required to sua 
sponte allow amendment to the complaint, 
and (2) complaint failed to state RICO 
cause of action. 
Affirmed. 
1. Federal Civil Procedure *=>826 
Trial court was not required to sua 
sponte allow plaintiffs to amend their com-
plaint to state claim for relief prior to dis-
missal. 
GLENN v. FIRST NAT. BANK IN GRAND JUNCTION 
Cite as 868 TJld 368 (10th Cir. 1989) 369 
2. Federal Civil Procedure <*»824 
Motion to dismiss for failure to state 
claim was not responsive pleading, and 
thus plaintiffs could have amended com-
plaint as of right after they received such 
motion and prior to trial court's decision. 
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 15(a), 28 U.S.OA. 
3. Federal Civil Procedure <*»849 
Plaintiffs' request, in response to de-
fendant's motion to dismiss, for leave to 
amend complaint or file more definite state-
ment with respect to particular areas court 
believed they had failed to state claim for 
relief, did not constitute motion for leave to 
amend; court had not yet ruled on motion 
to dismiss, and if plaintiffs had any 
grounds for amending, they could have 
amended as matter of right at time they 
issued their request. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. 
Rule 15(a), 28 U.S.C.A. 
4. Commerce *=>82.72 
Complaint failed to state RICO cause 
of action; factual assertions were not 
matched with elements of particular sub-
section of RICO statute, and allegations 
were too vague and conclusory to state 
claim for relief under RICO. 18 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 1961-1968. 
Submitted on the briefs: * 
Bradley P. Pollock of Bell & Pollock, 
P.C, Littleton, Colo., for plaintiffs-appel-
lants. 
Timothy P. Schimberg of Fowler & 
Schimberg, P.C, of counsel, Thomas J. Bis-
sell, and Jane E. Westbrook, Denver, Colo., 
for defendants-appellees. 
Before LOGAN, BRORBY and 
EBEL, Circuit Judges. 
BRORBY, Circuit Judge. 
Plaintiffs, Bonnie Glenn and Glenn's En-
terprises, Inc. (Appellants), filed a com-
plaint against the bank; two of the officers 
of the bank; and a guarantor. (The bank 
•After examining the briefs and the appellate 
record, this panel has unanimously determined 
that oral argument would not materially assist 
the determination of this appeal. See Fed.R. 
and the bank officers hereinafter are re-
ferred to as Appellees.) Appellants assert-
ed a violation of the Racketeer Influenced 
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) un-
der 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1984), and five 
pendent claims. Appellees filed a motion 
to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed.R. 
Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief could be granted. Appel-
lants filed a response to this motion, asking 
the trial court to require the defendants to 
answer, or, in the alternative, "that leave 
be given to the Plaintiffs to amend their 
Complaint or file a more definite statement 
with respect to those particular areas 
where the Court believes and/or deter-
mines that the Plaintiffs have failed to 
state a claim for relief." 
Setting forth detailed reasons for its ac-
tions, the trial court dismissed the RICO 
claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), and dis-
missed the pendent claims for lack of juris-
diction. The order dismissing the com-
plaint did not address Appellants' "request 
to amend" contained in their response to 
the motion to dismiss. Following the trial 
court's dismissal, Appellants did not file a 
motion for leave to amend under Fed.R. 
Civ.P. 15, nor a motion to alter or amend 
the judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e), nor 
a motion for relief from a judgment for 
mistake under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b), nor any 
other motion. Rather, Appellants chose to 
appeal. Appellants assert the trial court 
erred in not allowing them to amend their 
complaint They assert further error in 
the trial court's refusal to review the intro-
ductory allegations contained in their com-
plaint in order to match them with the 
elements of a RICO claim. We AFFIRM 
the decision of the trial court 
I 
[1] Appellants state their first issue as 
follows: "Did the court error [sic] in its 
failure to allow the plaintiffs to amend 
their complaint to state a claim for relief 
prior to dismissing the Bubject case and 
App.P. 34(a); 10th Cir.R. 34.1.9. The cause is 
therefore ordered submitted without oral argu-
ment. 
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complaint?" Appellants contend that they 
moved for leave to amend and erroneously 
were denied that permission. In our view, 
no such motion was before the court Ap-
pellants failed to exercise their right to 
amend prior to the trial court's decision, 
and also failed to move for leave to amend 
after the trial court granted the motion to 
dismiss, under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15, in conjunc-
tion with a motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) 
or Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). Because the district 
judge was not obliged to consider the mat-
ter, he committed no error. 
[2] Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a) provides that a 
party may amend its pleadings once as a 
matter of course at any time before a re-
sponsive pleading is served. Recognized 
pleadings are listed in Fed.R.Civ.P. 7(a) as 
a complaint, an answer, a reply to a coun-
terclaim denominated as such, an answer to 
a cross-claim, a third-party complaint, and a 
third-party answer. "No other pleading 
shall be allowed." Id Ordinarily, a mo-
tion to dismiss is not deemed a responsive 
pleading. Cooper v. Shumway, 780 F.2d 
27, 29 (10th Cir.1985). Consequently, Ap-
pellants could have amended as of right 
after they received the motion to dismiss 
and prior to the trial court's decision. Ap-
pellants failed to exercise their right to 
amend and chose instead to stand on their 
complaint 
After the court granted the motion to 
dismiss, Appellants could have amended 
their complaint only by leave of court or by 
written consent of the adverse party. Fed. 
R.Civ.P. 15(a); O'Bryan v. Chandler, 852 
F.2d 987, 990 (10th Cir.1965), cert denied* 
884 U.S. 926, 86 S.Ct 1444, 16 L.Ed.2d 580 
(1966). Appellants could have filed a mo-
tion under Rule 15(a) in conjunction with a 
motion to amend the judgment under Fed. 
R.Civ.P. 59(e), or a motion for relief due to 
mistake under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). Under 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 7(b), "[a]n application to the 
court for an order shall be made by motion 
which . . . shall state with particularity the 
grounds therefor, and shall set forth the 
relief or order sought" Id. Appellants 
failed to file any motion. 
[8] In response to the Appellees' motion 
to dismiss, Appellants requested that the 
court require the Appellees to answer, or, 
in the alternative, "that leave be given to 
the Plaintiffs [Appellants] to amend their 
Complaint or file a more definite statement 
with respect to those particular areas 
where the Court believes and/or deter-
mines that the Plaintiffs have failed to 
state a claim for relief." Appellants urge 
us to construe this request, made prior to 
the dismissal, as a motion for leave to 
amend. We decline to do so. In our view, 
Appellants' request does not rise to the 
status of a motion. The request is not an 
application for an order contemplated un-
der the rules, and the request states no 
grounds let alone "particular" grounds for 
the request If Appellants had any 
grounds for amending, they could have 
amended as a matter of right at the time 
they issued their request Obviously, ei-
ther they had no additional facts or they 
felt they had stated a claim. 
Appellants could not file a request for 
leave to amend without first complying 
with Fed.R.Civ.P. 11. Rule 11 requires 
that the signature of an attorney on a 
pleading certify to the best of the signer's 
knowledge, information, and belief, formed 
after reasonable inquiry, that the pleading 
is well grounded in fact and is warranted 
by existing law or a good-faith argument 
for a change in the law. Furthermore, 
Rule 11 contemplates and demands an at-
torney's investigation of both the facts and 
the law, and this cannot be done when the 
attorney, as here, apparently does not 
know what is necessary to state a claim. 
Rule 11 applies to motions. Wright & Mil-
ler, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1191 
at 84 (1971). The premature request for 
leave to amend was without basis and was 
a mere "shot in the dark." There could be 
no compliance with Rule 11 until Appel-
lants first ascertained what was necessary 
to state a claim. 
Because the issue was never before it, 
the district court did not refuse to permit 
Appellants to amend their complaint For 
the same reason, we will not construe the 
court's silence as an implicit denial of a 
motion. 
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Appellants next urge us to grant leave to 
amend as a matter of right after dismissal 
as a "request" therefor was made prior to 
the court's dismissal. We cannot agree. 
If Appellants' theory were to be adopted, 
the pleading phase of a lawsuit would nev-
er end. Such a practice would undermine 
the distinctions in Fed.R.Civ.P. 15 between 
"right" to amend and 'leave" to amend, 
and plaintiffs' counsel would then have the 
right to amend indefinitely simply by in-
cluding a "request to amend" in their re-
sponse to a motion to disriiss. 
Under the facts of this case, we hold that 
Appellant did not move the court for leave 
to amend the complaint and therefore the 
district judge committed no error in not 
ruling thereon. A naked request for leave 
to amend asked for as alternative relief 
when a party has the unexercised right to 
amend is not sufficient. After a motion to 
dismiss has been granted, plaintiffs must 
first reopen the case pursuant to a motion 
under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b) and then file 
a motion under Rule 15, and properly apply 
to the court for leave to amend by means 
of a motion which in turn complies with 
Rule 7. In that event, in accordance with 
Rule 15, "leave shall be freely given when 
justice so requires." Id; Foman v. Davis, 
371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct 227, 230, 9 
LEd.2d 222 (1962). Furthermore, this 
court has allowed the plaintiff ten days 
after dismissal to amend the complaint 
Eames v. City of Logan, 762 F.2d 83, 85 
(10th Cir.1985); Leggett v. Montgomery 
Ward & Co., 178 F.2d 436, 438 (10th Cir. 
1949). Appellants availed themselves of 
none of their legal options. Appellants' 
failures are well beyond "mere technicali-
ties" and this court will not protect them 
from their own inaction. 
II 
[4] Appellants state their second issue 
as follows: "Did the court error [sic] in its 
refusal to review the introductory allega-
tions to determine if said allegations are 
sufficient to state a claim for relief?" The 
trial court reviewed all of Appellants' alle-
1. Rohler was miscited as "576 V2& 1260 (CAJth 
1978)." We located the case at 576 F^d 1260 
gations and liberally construed the com-
plaint The trial judge described Appel-
lants' method of pleading as "shotgun" 
pleading and stated that he was not going 
to do Appellants' work for them to connect 
assertions with elements of all sections of 
the RICO law. Most importantly, the trial 
court found the allegations "too vague and 
conclusory to stale a claim for relief under 
RICO." The trial court's order of January 
16, 1987, thoroughly analyzed the RICO 
claim and concluded in part: 
Plaintiffs have failed to state the facts 
that support the elements of their RICO 
claim within the allegations of their First 
Claim for Relief. I will not search 
through the several paragraphs of the 
plaintiffs' "Introductory Allegations" 
and attempt to match the factual asser-
tions with the elements of all subsections 
of the RICO statute to determine if the 
complaint states a claim for relief. Nei-
ther will I require the defendants to 
"piece" together the plaintiffs' com-
plaint. Plaintiffs are required to assert, 
in good faith and subject to Rule 11, 
Fed.R.Civ.P. the RICO subsection or sub-
sections on which they rely and support 
each claim with allegations of fact. 
Moreover, the plaintiffs' allegations 
are too vague and conclusory to state a 
claim under RICO. 
The law recognizes a significant difference 
between notice pleading and "shotgun" 
pleading. 
Apparently, even Appellants do not con-
tend their purported RICO claim was suffi-
cient. They neither contend nor establish 
in their brief that this "pleading" sets forth 
a claim as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 8. Ap-
pellants cite two unpersuasive cases in sup-
port of their contentions on this issue: New 
York State Waterways Ass'n, Inc. v. Dia-
mond, 469 F.2d 419 (2d Cir.1972), and Roh-
ler v. TRW, Inc., "576 F.2d 1260 (C.A.7th 
1978)."1 In New York State Waterways, 
the court held that "it is our duty to read 
[the complaint] liberally, to determine 
whether the facts set forth justify taking 
jurisdiction...." 469 F.2d at 421. In our 
case, the record indicates that the court did 
(7th Cir. 1978), and note that Rohler was not the 
only case miscited by appellants in their brief. 
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in fact liberally construe the complaint 
The trial court's meticulous order recites in 
part as follows: "Plaintiffs have attempted 
to set forth the details of their action in the 
'Introductory Allegations' section of their 
complaint Liberally construing the com-
plaint, it appears that " Furthermore, 
Appellants' second issue is not a liberal 
construction issue, but whether the trial 
court was obligated to construct a cause of 
action from allegations in a complaint filed 
by a party who was unwilling or unable to 
plead the cause of action himself. Conse-
quently, New York State Waterways does 
not apply to this case. 
Likewise, Rohler is distinguishable. In 
Rohler, the court dismissed the complaint, 
but piamtiff filed a motion for reconsidera-
tion and for leave to file an amended com-
plaint, complete with a proposed amended 
complaint The trial court denied permis-
sion to amend. The circuit court reversed, 
holding the court must grant leave to 
amend to allow plaintiff to attempt to com-
ply with the jurisdictional requirement In 
tins case, however, Appellants filed no mo-
tion for leave to amend, and they neither 
conceived nor produced a proposed amend-
ed complaint Consequently, Rohler is dis-
tinguishable from this case on the facts. 
Although Appellants did not designate 
the complaint as part of the record on 
appeal, we have obtained a copy of the 
complaint in accordance with 10th Cir.R. 
10.2.4. After reviewing the record as sup-
plemented by us, we conclude the trial 
court did not err in refusing to attempt to 
create order out of chaos. The complaint 
failed to state a claim under any conceiva-
ble matching of allegations. 
Because Appellants neither made a show-
ing in accordance with Rule 11 that they 
were able to amend and state a claim, nor 
filed a motion in accordance with Rule 7 
showing with particularity the grounds 
therefor, we will not direct Appellants be 
given an opportunity to amend. The com-
plaint failed to state a claim. The decision 
of the trial court as set forth in its order of 
January 16, 1987 is AFFIRMED. 
Karen L. HOKANSEN, fka Karen L. Neil; 
Cecile Lou Browning, heir-at-law and 
next of kin of Aimee Uffner, deceased 
minor, Cecile Lou Browning, Successor 
To Randall J. Price, Special Adminis-
trator of the Estate of Aimee Uffner, 
deceased; Amalia R. Zapata; and Ama-
lia R Zapata, Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
• . 
UNITED STATES of America, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Nos. 86-2136, 86-2137, 86-2139 
and 86-2140. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Tenth Circuit 
Feb. 16, 1989. 
Victim of shooting and representatives 
of deceased victims brought Federal Tort 
Claims Act action against United States 
alleging that Veterans Administration hos-
pital negligently breached duty to victims 
to prevent release of voluntary psychiatric 
inpatient because he had known general 
history of mental and emotional problems 
which included violent tendencies. The 
United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Kansas, Sam A. Crow, J., dismissed 
action. Plaintiffs appealed. The Court of 
Appeals, Stephen H. Anderson, Circuit 
Judge, held that hospital did not have duty 
under Kansas law not to release voluntary 
patient, and thus, hospital could not be held 
liable for damages. 
Affirmed. 
Holloway, Chief Judge, filed a dissent-
ing opinion. 
1. Mental Health *»414(3) 
Under Kansas law, Veterans Adminis-
tration hospital did not have duty to pre-
vent release of voluntary psychiatric inpa-
tient on basis of known general history of 
mental and emotional problems which in-
MENDE v. DUN & 
Ote as 6701 
[3] A number of public policy concerns 
underlie the need for grand jury secrecy.1 
Disclosure of certain grand jury materials 
to Dr. Chadwick to enable him to express 
his expert opinion concerning the cause of 
the child's death to the grand jury in no 
way contravened any of these policies. The 
government could have familiarized Dr. 
Chadwick with the facts surrounding the 
child's death by posing a complex hypotheti-
cal question. In the circumstances present-
ed, this approach would have been unduly 
cumbersome. The most expeditious and re-
liable way for Dr. Chadwick to prepare for 
his expert testimony was to review tran-
scripts of the testimony of prior grand jury 
witnesses and examine other evidence 
presented to the grand jury. Since he ex-
amined these materials under court supervi-
sion, sufficient safeguards existed to pre-
vent abuse of the procedure. 
Additionally, Fed.R.Crim.P. 6(eX3XCXi) 
provides that a court may order disclosure 
of grand jury materials "preliminarily to or 
in connection with a judicial proceeding." 
We need not decide whether a grand jury 
proceeding is "a judicial proceeding" under 
Rule 6(e), as it seems clear that grand jury 
proceedings are at least preliminary to a 
judicial proceeding. United States v. Stan-
ford, 589 FJ2d 285, 292 (7th Cir. 1978).2 We 
1. Reasons for grand jury secrecy are stated in 
United States v. Proctor and Gamble, 356 U.S. 
677, 681-682 n.6, 78 S.Ct. 983, 985-986 n.6, 2 
L.Ed.2d 1077 (1958), quoting United States v. 
Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 628-629 (3rd Cir. 1954): 
"(1) To prevent the escape of those whose 
indictment may be contemplated; (2) to insure 
the utmost freedom to the grand jury in its 
deliberations, and to prevent persons subject to 
indictment or their friends from importuning 
the grand jurors; (3) to prevent subornation of 
perjury or tampering with the witnesses who 
may testify before grand jury and later appear 
at the trial of those indicted by it; (4) to en-
courage free and untrammeled disclosures by 
persons who have information with respecj to 
the commission of crimes; (5) to protect inno-
cent accused who is exonerated from disclo-
sure of the fact that he has been under investi-
gation, and from the expense of standing trial 
where there was no probability of guilt." 
2. Citing United States v. Tager, 638 FJ2d 167 
(10th Cir. 1980), Mayes maintains that disclo-
sure, under judicial supervision, of certain 
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conclude that in the circumstances present-
ed, the examination by Dr. Chadwick of 
grand jury materials was proper and the 
district court did not abuse its discretion by 
authorizing such disclosure under Rule 6(e). 
[4] Mayes's motion to dismiss the indict-
ment because only eleven grand jurors at-
tended every session raises an issue whose 
resolution is controlled by United States v. 
Leverage Funding Systems, Inc., 637 F.2d 
645 (9th Cir. 1980). 
AFFIRMED. 
O I «YNUMBER SYSUM> 
Milton MENDE, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
DUN & BRADSTREET, INC, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
No. 80-5711. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Ninth Circuit. 
Argued and Submitted Jan. 7, 1982. 
Decided Feb. 25, 1982. 
Plaintiff brought suit seeking damages 
and injunctive relief from defendant for 
grand jury materials to Dr. Chadwick was im-
proper under Rule 6(eX3)(CX0. Tager in-
volved the propriety of a subsection (CX0 dis-
closure of grand jury materials to a private, 
nongovernmental investigator to enable him 
further to assist governmental attorneys in an 
ongoing investigation. The court noted that a 
governmental attorney's need for assistance in 
the enforcement of federal criminal law is ad-
dressed, not by subsection (C)(i), but by sub-
section (A)(ii) of Rule 6(e) which limits disclo-
sure to "government personnel." 638 F2d at 
170. Without expressing a view as to the cor-
rectness of the Tager decision, we note that Dr. 
Chadwick was not called upon to assist govern-
mental attorneys as a private investigator in an 
ongoing investigation, but was asked to ex-
press his expert medical opinion based in part 
on certain evidence previously presented to the 
grand jury. As such Dr. Chadwick's expert 
testimony before the grand jury did not come 
within the provisions of subsection (A)(ii). 
ffOFJd-S 
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alleged improper consumer credit reporting 
pursuant to California Consumer Credit Re-
porting Agencies Act. Action was filed in 
state court and removed to the United 
States District Court for the Central Dis-
trict of California, which Court, Terry J. 
Hatter, Jr., J., granted summary judgment 
against plaintiff, and plaintiff appealed. 
The Court of Appeals, Ferguson, Circuit 
Judge, held that: (1) trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs 
motion to file amended complaint; (2) com-
mercial credit report published by defend-
ant was not a "consumer credit report" 
within meaning of the California Act; and 
(3) defendant was not a "consumer credit 
reporting agency" under the California Act. 
Affirmed. 
1. Federal Civil Procedure <e=>828 
Federal Courts «=>817 
Allowance of leave to amend lies with-
in discretion of trial court and is reviewable 
only for abuse of discretion. 
2. Federal Civil Procedure <s=>830, 832 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in denying plaintiff's motion to file amend-
ed complaint, in view of plaintiff's delay in 
answering interrogatories as ordered by the 
court, 25-month delay between filing of ini-
tial complaint and motion to amend, dis-
covery of no new facts, revival of some 
previously used theories, and further prepa-
ration that admission of new causes would 
require. 
3. Consumer Credit *=»16 
Credit information published by de-
fendant concerning business entities or indi-
viduals engaged in business in their busi-
ness capacities, and not as consumers was 
not a "consumer credit report" within 
meaning of California Consumer Credit Re-
porting Agencies Act, as would subject de-
fendant to liability for disseminating false 
or obsolete information about consumer. 
•Honorable Stanley A Weigel, United States 
Distnct Judge, Northern District of California, 
West's Ann.Cal.Civ.Code § 1785(c) (Re-
pealed). 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
4. Consumer Credit e»16 
Defendant which published credit in-
formation concerning business entities or 
individuals engaged in business in their 
business capacities, and not as consumers, 
was not a "consumer credit reporting agen-
cy" under California Consumer Credit Re-
porting Agencies Act, as would subject de-
fendant to liability for disseminating false 
or obsolete information about consumer. 
West's Ann.Cal.Civ.Code § 1785.3(d). 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
Michael J. Schwartz, Law Offices of Mi-
chael J. Schwartz, Canoga Park, Cal., for 
plaintiff-appellant. 
Edwin Freston, Los Angeles, Cal., ar-
gued, for defendant-appellee; Lew W. 
Cramer, Los Angeles, Cal., on brief. 
Appeal from the United States District 
Court for the Central District of California. 
Before PREGERSON and FERGUSON, 
Circuit Judges, and WEIGEL,* District 
Judge. 
FERGUSON, Circuit Judge: 
I. BACKGROUND 
In 1978, plaintiff Mende filed a complaint 
against defendant Dun & Bradstreet in the 
state superior court. A month later the 
complaint was removed to federal district 
court under diversity jurisdiction. Plain-
tiffs complaint sought damages and injunc-
tive relief from Dun & Bradstreet for al-
leged improper consumer credit reporting 
pursuant to the California Consumer Credit 
Reporting Agencies Act, Cal.Civ.Code 
§ 1785 et seq Plaintiff's four causes of 
action were for (1) reporting obsolete credit 
sitting by designation 
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information, (2) reporting inaccuracies in 
consumer reports, (3) failure to reinvesti-
gate or delete inaccurate or unverifiable 
information, and (4) an injunction against 
the issuance of defendant's reports. 
Dun & Bradstreet filed an answer deny-
ing, inter alia, that it had an obligation to 
comply with the pertinent sections of the 
California Consumer Credit Reporting 
Agencies Act ("California Act"). 
Dun & Bradstreet subsequently filed an 
amended answer that did not raise any new 
defenses but that included a counterclaim 
for attorneys' fees. On June 10, 1980, the 
district court granted a motion of defend-
ant for an order compelling plaintiff to 
answer interrogatories and for attorneys' 
fees in the amount of $300. 
Three days later, plaintiff filed a notice 
of a motion for leave to file an amended 
complaint. Plaintiffs proposed amended 
complaint added new theories based on fed-
eral statutes, the United States Constitu-
tion, libel and negligence laws. 
Defendant filed various affidavits in sup-
port of its motion for summary judgment 
The district court denied plaintiff's motion 
to amend his complaint and granted sum-
mary judgment against plaintiff. The dis-
trict court concluded that Dun & Bradstreet 
is not a business entity within the provi-
sions of the California Act and, in particu-
lar, is not a "consumer credit reporting 
agency" within the meaning of the Act. 
This appeal presents two issues: 
1. Was it an abuse of discretion for the 
trial court to deny plaintiffs motion 
to file an amended complaint? 
2. Did the district court properly grant 
summary judgment against plaintiff? 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT 
ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY DE-
NYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT 
[1] The allowance of leave to amend lies 
within the discretion of the trial court and 
1. Plaintiff did not inform the court below that 
some of the issues in the proposed amended 
complaint had been raised 14 years earlier in 
Mende v. Union, Los Angeles Supenor Court 
is reviewable only for an abuse of discre-
tion. Izaak Walton League of America v. 
St Clair, 497 F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1974). See 
also Kirby v. P. R Mallory & Co., 489 F.2d 
904, 912 (7th Cir. 1973). The only question 
here is whether the court abused its discre-
tion in denying plaintiff's motion to amend. 
[2] In the instant case, the complaint 
was filed in federal court on April 24, 1978. 
The plaintiff filed a notice of a motion for 
leave to amend on June 13,1980, 25 months 
after the original complaint. The amended 
complaint is brought only to assert new 
theories, not because any new facts came to 
plaintiff's attention. It is worth noting 
that the amended complaint was filed three 
days after the court ordered plaintiff to 
answer interrogatories, to deliver them to 
defendant no later than July 25, 1980, and 
to pay defendant $300 in attorney's fees. 
Thus, the court apparently believed there 
had been undue delay even before plaintiff 
filed his amended complaint. It is also 
noteworthy that plaintiff filed a lawsuit 
against defendant in 1966 asserting causes 
of action for libel, slander, invasion of pri-
vacy, and interference with business rela-
tionships.1 In view of plaintiffs delay in 
answering interrogatories, the 25-month de-
lay between the filing of the initial com-
plaint and the motion to amend, the dis-
covery of no new facts, the revival of some 
previously used theories, and the further 
preparation that the admission of new caus-
es would require, we conclude that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion by deny-
ing leave to amend. 
HI. DID THE DISTRICT COURT PROP-
ERLY GRANT SUMMARY JUDG-
MENT? 
Plaintiff argues that two genuine issues 
of material fact stood in the way of summa-
ry judgment: (A) Whether Dun & Brad-
street reports are consumer credit reports, 
and (B) whether Dun & Bradstreet is a 
Action No 885 836 (filed May, 1966), which 
was dismissed for failure to timely amend. 
Dun & Bradstreet was also named as a defend-
ant in that case. 
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consumer credit reporting agency. The sig-
nificance of these question is that an af-
firmative answer to each could subject Dun 
& Bradstreet to liability under the Califor-
nia Act for disseminating false or obsolete 
information about a consumer. 
A. The Dun & Bradstreet Reports in 
Issue Are Not Consumer Credit Re-
ports Within the Meaning of the Cal-
ifornia Act. 
The California Act defines a "consumer 
credit report" as: 
any written,oral, or other communication 
of any information by a consumer credit 
reporting agency bearing on a consumer's 
credit worthiness, credit standing, or 
credit capacity, which is used or is expect-
ed to be used, or collected in whole or in 
part, for the purpose of serving as a 
factor in establishing the consumer's eli-
gibility for: (1) credit to be used primari-
ly for personal family or household pur-
poses, or (2) employment purposes, or (3) 
other purposes authorized in Section 
1785.11. 
Cal.Civ.Code § 1785(c) No California case 
construes the term "consumer credit re-
port" in the California Act; the parties 
therefore have examined the construction 
of the virtually identical phrase "consumer 
report" in the Federal Fair Credit Report-
ing Act ("Federal Act"), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et 
seq. The legislative history of the Federal 
Act supports the proposition that the defini-
tion does not cover business credit reports. 
S.Rep.No. 91-517, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1969) (Committee on Banking & Currency). 
Defendant maintains that the Dun & 
Bradstreet Reports relate to the business 
entities in which plaintiff participated. 
Moreover, defendant has filed affidavits to 
the effect that it only provides credit infor-
mation concerning business entities or indi-
viduals engaged in their business capacities. 
The affidavits indicate that Dun & Brad-
street has not prepared consumer reports 
since 1974. Dun & Bradstreet also requires 
that its subscribers sign an agreement that 
they will use reports on businesses only as a 
basis for credit to businesses in their capaci-
ty as such. 
The instant case is like Wrigley v. Dun & 
Bradstreet, 375 F.Supp. 969 (W.D.Ga.1974), 
in which the court granted summary judg-
ment against Wrigley on the following find-
ings and conclusions: 
. . . The Court finds that the undisputed 
facts of the instant action are that Dun & 
Bradstreet issued its credit report on 
Wrigley Construction Co. for Dun & 
Bradstreet subscribers to use in deciding 
whether to extend commercial credit to 
Wrigley Construction Co. It is therefore 
clear that the Fair Credit Reporting Act 
would not ordinarily apply to the credit 
report issues on Wrigley Construction Co. 
* * * * * * 
. . . Dun & Bradstreet issued a credit 
rej>ort on Wrigley Construction Co. which 
contained information on the personal fi-
nancial situation of Mr. Wrigley. The 
credit report issued was for the extension 
of commercial credit and the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act therefore does not apply. 
Accordingly, the Court grants Dun & 
Bradstreet's motion for summary judg-
ment. 
Id. at 970, 971 (footnote omitted). 
Mende filed no competent evidence in the 
trial court opposing the Dun & Bradstreet 
affidavits. He made no showing whatsoev-
er that the reports were used for consumer 
purposes. The trial court properly used the 
affidavits to find that there was no genuine 
issue of material fact as to whether Dun & 
Bradstreet issued a consumer credit report 
"The very mission of the summary judg-
ment procedure is to pierce the pleadings 
and to assess the proof in order to see 
whether there is a genuine issue of fact." 
Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 
Fed.RCiv.Proc. 56(e). 
[3] Plaintiff suggests that the reports 
here at issue "could" have been used as 
consumer credit reports, and on that basis 
argues for the application of the very ex-
pansive definition of consumer credit report 
in Belshaw v. Credit Bureau of Prescott, 
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392 F.Supp. 1356 (D.Ariz.1975).2 Belshaw 
held that 
"consumer report" must be interpreted to 
mean any report made by a credit report-
ing agency of information that could be 
used for one of the purposes enumerated 
in § 1681a. 
Id. at 1359-60 (emphasis in the original). 
The Belshaw definition depends on whether 
information could be used for certain pur-
poses, not on whether it is collected for 
certain purposes. This expansive interpre-
tation of consumer report has been criti-
cized as bringing "within the coverage of 
the Act any gathering of information about 
an individual, even if the context were such 
clearly non-consumer activities as engage-
ment in profit-making transactions . . . or 
litigation against a defendant whose insurer 
requests a report " Henry v. Forbes, 
433 F.Supp. 5, 9 n.5 (D.Minn.1976). 
Here there was no evidence that the re-
ports were used for any other purpose than 
their intended purpose as commercial credit 
reports. We do not believe that the mere 
fact that a report could be used as a con-
sumer report is enough to make it one. 
More is required; however, we reserve the 
question of just what additional showing is 
required until a case properly presents the 
issue. 
In passing, we note that the present case 
is very different from Beresh v. Retail 
Credit Co., 358 F.Supp. 260 (C.D.Cal.1973). 
Beresh held that reports prepared by a con-
sumer-reporting agency for the purpose of 
determining whether an insured was dis-
abled, and purportedly used by the insurer 
for the purpose of terminating monthly 
2. Belshaw is easily distinguishable on its face 
from the present case and from other cases 
that have applied more restrictive interpreta-
tions to the Federal Act. Indeed, Belshaw ex-
pressly distinguished previous cases, including 
Wrigley v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 375 F.Supp. 
969 (N.D.Ga.1974), that had construed the Fed-
eral Act more narrowly: 
In those cases the Act was construed as not 
applicable to reports made by credit report-
ing agencies on individuals where a corpora-
tion or business in which the individual was a 
principal had applied for credit or insurance. 
Those cases are readily distinguishable from 
the present case in two respects. 
payments, were "consumer reports" within 
the meaning of the Federal Act. The court 
reasoned that the reports were consumer 
reports within the meaning of the Federal 
Act because they were used "in connection 
with a business transaction involving a con-
sumer." 358 F.Supp. at 262. In Beresh, 
there was no dispute that the credit agency 
was a "consumer reporting agency" within 
the meaning of 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f). 
Second, Beresh was a consumer who had 
bought personal insurance. In contrast, 
Dun & Bradstreet disputes that it is a con-
sumer reporting agency. Moreover, Dun & 
Bradstreet claims that its reports relate to 
Mende only in his business capacity, not his 
individual consumer capacity. Thus, Beresh 
is clearly distinguishable. 
B. Dun & Bradstreet Is Not a Consumer 
Credit Reporting Agency. 
[4] The California Act defines "consum-
er credit reporting agency" to mean 
any person who, for monetary fees, dues, 
or on a cooperative non-profit basis, regu-
larly engages in whole or in part in the 
practice of assembling or evaluating con-
sumer credit information or other infor-
mation on consumers for the purpose of 
furnishing consumer reports to third par-
ties . . . . 
Cal.Civ.Code § 1785.3(d). As discussed 
above in subpart III(A), Dun & Bradstreet 
affidavits show that its credit information 
concerns business entities or individuals en-
gaged in business in their business capaci-
ties, and not as consumers. On the basis of 
these affidavits, it appears that Dun & 
First, if an individual chooses to do busi-
ness as a corporation in order to limit his 
liability, he must not expect the same degree 
of privacy as other individuals when applying 
for credit. He could apply for credit as an 
individual and retain the protection of the 
Act if he wishes. Second, in each of these 
cases, the individual was aware that his com-
pany had applied for credit or insurance and 
might be investigated. 
392 F.Supp. at 1360. The report in Belshaw 
was made with respect to the plaintiff as an 
individual consumer; the Dun & Bradstreet re-
ports in the instant case are made with respect 
to Mende in his business capacity. 
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Bradstreet is not a consumer credit report-
ing agency. Under the Federal Act, if a 
reporting entity is not a consumer reporting 
agency within the meaning of the Act, then 
such entity cannot be held to have violated 
the statute, and dismissal is required. Bel-
shaw v. Credit Bureau ofPrescott, supra, at 
1361. The same result should follow under 
the California Act 
CONCLUSION 
First the district court did not abuse its 
discretion by denying plaintiffs motion to 
amend his complaint. Second, the district 
court properly granted summary judgment 
because there was no genuine issue of ma-
terial fact. Defendant's affidavits, which 
were not controverted by any affidavits or 
other evidentiary material filed by Mende, 
were sufficient to show that Dun & Brad-
street does not issue consumer credit re-
ports and that it is not a consumer credit 
reporting agency within the meaning of the 
California Act. 
AFFIRMED. 
O I KCY NUMBER SYSTEM 
Marcella CSIBI, Ludovic Csibi, Aurora 
Csibi and Maria Csibi, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v. 
Gizela FUSTOS, etc., 
Defendants-Appellees. 
No. 81-4100. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Ninth Circuit. 
Argued and Submitted Oct. 14, 1981. 
Decided Feb. 26, 1982. 
Action was brought by decedent's al-
leged first wife and her children to estal>-
lish their rights in decedent's estate. The 
United States District Court for the North-
ern District of California, William W 
Schwarzer, J., dismissed action, and wife 
and children appealed. The Court of Ap-
peals, Lucas, District Judge, sitting by des-
ignation, held that action, in which all re-
covery hinged on determination of marital 
status, was within historic domestic rela-
tions exception to diversity jurisdiction, and 
thus District Court lacked subject-matter 
jurisdiction over dispute. 
Order vacated and action dismissed for 
lack of jurisdiction. 
1. Federal Courts e=»30, 622 
Lack of subject-matter jurisdiction can 
be raised on court's own motion at any 
time, and can be raised for first time on 
appeal. 
2. Federal Courts <s=>8, 284 
Domestic relations cases are within the 
Article III judicial power of the federal 
courts, but outside power bestowed by Con-
gress in diversity statute 28 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1332(a)(2); U.S.C.A.Const.Art. 3, § 1 et 
seq. 
3. Federal Courts <s=»284 
States have interest in family relations 
superior to that of federal government, and 
state courts have more expertise in field of 
domestic relations, and thus no federal di-
versity subject-matter jurisdiction exists 
over domestic disputes. 28 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1332(a)(2). 
4. Federal Courts <*=>47 
Federal courts may exercise their dis-
cretion to abstain from deciding cases in 
which domestic relations problems are in-
volved tangentially to other issues determi-
native of case. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(aX2). 
5. Federal Courts e=»284 
Where case turned on marital status of 
decedent and his alleged first and second 
wives, where first wife had to establish her 
own status as decedent's legal spouse and 
disprove second wife's status as good faith 
putative spouse in order to recover, and 
where part of first wife's prayer for relief 
was request for annulment of second mar-
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careful and explicit on this subject If the 
ALT rejected such evidence then he would 
have dealt with this subject in an explicit 
fashion. Gee v. Celebrezze, 355 F.2d 849 
(7th Cir. 1966); Hicks v. Gardner, 393 F^d 
299 (4th Cir. 1968); Cutler v. Weinberger, 
616 FM 1282 (2d Cir. 1975). 
The comment in Cutler v. Weinberger, 
616 TM 1282,1286 (2d Cir. 1975), has point-
ed application here: 
"While the determination of another 
governmental agency that a social securi-
ty disability benefits claimant is disabled 
is not binding on the Secretary, it is enti-
tled to some weight and should be con-
sidered. See Robinson v. Richardson, 360 
F.Supp. 243, 249 (E.D.N.Y.1973); Zimbal-
ist v. Richardson, 334 F.Supp. 1350, 1355 
(E.D.N.Y.1971); Pendergraph v. Cele-
brezze, 255 F.Supp. 313, 321 (M.D.N.C. 
1966)." 
[11] The principles announced by this 
Court in Lonzollo v. Weinberger, 534 F.2d 
712 (7th Cir. 1976), and Daniels v. Mathews, 
567 F.2d 845 (8th Cir. 1977), requires the 
remand of this case to give the Secretary an 
opportunity to consider and make findings 
on the subject of the state's separate deter-
mination of disability. 
Again on this issue, even minimal advoca-
cy would suggest arguing for the decision 
by the Secretary to be consistent with the 
state's separate determination of disability. 
On remand such will be possible. 
On remand, the claimant must be given 
an opportunity to develop evidence relating 
to her total physical and mental problems, 
including obesity and mental illness, as the 
same may bear on the question of disability. 
Therefore, the decision of the District 
Court is REVERSED and this case is RE-
MANDED for proceedings consistent with 
this order. 
* This appeal was originally decided by unreport-
ed order on August 21, 1978 See Circuit Rule 
Gordon D. MERTENS, Sr., and Marcella 
Mertens, Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v. 
Ralph HUMMELL, Individually and as 
Chief of Police of Barrington Hills et 
aL, Defendants-Appellees. 
No. 77-1734. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Seventh Circuit. 
Argued June 14, 1978. 
Decided Aug. 21, 1978.' 
Opinion Nov. 17, 1978. 
Appeal was taken in a civil action from 
an order of the United States District Court 
for the Northern District of Illinois, Ber-
nard M. Decker, J., dismissing the suit for 
noncompliance by plaintiffs with pretrial 
discovery orders and denying leave to file a 
third amended complaint. The Court of 
Appeals held that the trial court's actions 
did not involve abuse of discretion. 
Affirmed. 
Federal Civil Procedure *»839, 1741 
No abuse of discretion was involved in 
trial court's action in refusing to permit 
plaintiffs in civil action to file third amend-
ed complaint and in dismissing suit on 
ground that plaintiffs had failed to comply 
with prediscovery orders. Fed.Rules Civ. 
Proa rule 37(b), 28 U.S.C.A.; U.S.Ct. of 
App. 7tb Cir. Rule 35, 28 U.S.C.A. 
Eliot A. Landau, Woodridge, 111., for 
plaintiffs-appellants. 
James R. Schirott, David R. Novoselsky, 
Chicago, III, for defendants-appellees. 
Before CUMMINGS, SPRECHER and 
BAUER, Circuit Judges. 
35. The court has subsequently decided to 
issue the decision as an opinion. 
PER CURIAM. 
The court, having read the briefs, ad-
dressed itself to the record, and heard oral 
arguments, finds no abuse of discretion and 
no violation of constitutional rights in the 
lower court's order dismissing the appel-
lants' case under Rule 37(b) for noncompli-
ance with pre-trial discovery orders. Simi-
larly, we find no abuse of discretion in the 
lower court's denial of leave to file a third 
amended complaint. 
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in 
the district court's memorandum opinion,, 
that opinion is affirmed and adopted as the 
opinion of this court Costs are awarded to 
the appellees. 
AFFIRMED. 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 
EASTERN DIVISION 
NO 75 C 88 
GORDON MERTEXS, SR, et a/, 
Plaintiff, 
v 
RALPH HUMMELL, et &1 
Defendants 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
There is pending before the court a mo-
tion by certain defendants in this case to 
dismiss the instant action pursuant to F.R. 
Civ.P. 37(bX2XC) and 37(d) 
This motion accords with the report of 
Magistrate Balog, dated April 6, 1977, 
which recommended that the action be dis-
missed. The magistrate's report noted that 
the plaintiffs had failed to comply with 
several orders to produce discovery materi-
als. Magistrate Balog also commented that 
the plaintiffs had failed to comply with an 
order to prepare a first draft of the final 
pretrial order for this case. 
On November 10, 1976, the defendants 
filed a request to produce certain materials. 
This included a request (No. 5) for 
"[a]ny and all statements, transcriptions, 
records, notes, memoranda or other docu-
ments of interviews with witnesses to the 
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said occurrence, persons present before or 
after said occurrence, persons who have 
knowledge of said occurrence, persons 
who have knowledge of the allegations of 
the plaintiffs' complaint and persons who 
have knowledge concerning the plaintiffs' 
physical or mental condition before, dur-
ing and after the said occurrence." 
The record indicates that the defendants 
repeated their insistence upon compliance 
with this discovery request by letter and 
orally at various depositions. 
Since the filing of this discovery request, 
there have been repeated court orders com-
pelling the plaintiffs' compliance. On Janu-
ary 26, 1977, this court ordered "plaintiff to 
produce records to defendants." On Febru-
ary 11, 1977, Magistrate Balog ordered 
"[p]laintiff to produce all documents on De-
fendant's outstanding notice to produce in-
cluding . . . a list of all potential 
witnesses who have given statements". On 
March 3, 1977, the magistrate ordered 
"that if the plaintiffs are claiming that 
any of the statements, transcriptions, rec-
ords, notes, memoranda or other docu-
ments of interviews with witnesses, as 
requested in paragraph 5 of the Novem-
ber 10, 1976 request for production, are 
privileged from discovery, that the plain-
tiffs produce all such statements, tran-
scriptions, records, notes, memoranda or 
other documents of interviews with wit-
nesses to this court for an in-camera in-
spection for further disposition by this 
court." (Emphasis added.) 
The plaintiffs acknowledge the entry of 
these orders but maintain that they have 
complied with them. Their counsel con-
cedes that he never submitted the list of 
potential witnesses' statements but main-
tains this was "due to the fact that no such 
statements existed} [Emphasis in origi-
nal.] That further, the only memoranda or 
notes available to the Plaintiffs' attorneys 
were notes of the personal communications 
1. Counsel for the plaintiffs asserts that, al-
though various witnesses have been contacted, 
no statements, notes or memoranda relating to 
these contracts have ever been reduced to writ-
ing during the entire 28 month period during 
which this litigation has been pending 
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with the Plaintiffs, which were not the 
subject of Defendants' paragraph 5 of their 
Request for Production." 
It is apparently agreed by the parties 
that an attorney from plaintiffs' counsel's 
office represented to the magistrate on 
February 11,1977, that their office did pos-
sess certain notes, but asserted that they 
were privileged and exempt from discovery. 
Plaintiffs* lead counsel, who was not 
present on this occasion asserts that his 
associate had advised the court that these 
notes were limited to statements made by 
the plaintiffs. There is no supporting affi-
davit from Mr. Pellegrini, the associate who 
made the disputed representation. Defend-
ants' counsel, who was present in court on 
February 11th, maintains under oath that 
Pellegrini "stated in open court that the 
plaintiffs did have memoranda of inter-
views with witnesses as sought in para-
graph 5." It is also evident that Magistrate 
Balog was neither persuaded that the mate-
rials admittedly in plaintiffs' possession 
were privileged, nor that plaintiffs did not 
have materials covered by the discovery 
request. Thus, he entered on that day the 
order requiring production of a list of po-
tential witnesses who had given statements, 
and later required an in camera inspection 
2. The plaintiffs apparently never furnished any 
written explanation of their position (i. e. that 
they had never reduced any statement or con-
tact with witnesses to writing) until after the 
magistrate had found that their conduct merit-
ed dismissal. Had they made these representa-
tions in a timely fashion to the magistrate he 
would have been able to fashion discovery or-
ders which took these circumstances into con-
sideration. (£. g. he might have required the 
plaintiffs to compile a list of all witnesses who 
had been previously contacted and to submit a 
detailed summary of the testimony that each 
witness would give if called at trial.) By choos-
ing to ignore the discovery requests and the 
court orders without explanation, the plaintiffs 
obstructed the ability of the magistrate to per-
form his functions. 
3. The statements and conduct of plaintiffs' 
counsel appear to contradict the argument that 
counsel had consistently and unambiguously 
denied possessing any statements, memoranda, 
or notes of interviews with witnesses. 
prior to a determination of the existence of 
any privilege. 
In any event, there can be no dispute that 
the plaintiff never complied with the order 
to supply a written list of witnesses who 
have given statements.* Their current de-
nial of the existence of any such witnesses 
is not sufficient to comply with the magis-
trate orders.1 
Furthermore, the magistrate expressly 
stated that he reserved the ultimate deter-
mination of the validity of any claimed 
privilege for notes or statements in the 
possession of the plaintiffs. There is no 
dispute that plaintiffs did not submit the 
notes of plaintiffs' statements in their pos-
session for an in camera inspection, as man-
dated by the March 3rd order. The court 
therefore finds that it must sustain the 
magistrate's finding that the plaintiffs have 
failed to comply with the orders regarding 
the production of records.4 
Finally, there appears to be no dispute 
that the plaintiffs have failed to comply 
with the order to prepare a first draft of 
the final pretrial order. 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure al-
low the court to enter an order dismissing 
the action as a sanction where "a party fails 
to obey an order to provide or permit dis-
covery." F.R.Civ.P. 37(bX2XC). Rule 41(b) 
On January 21, 1977, plaintiffs' counsel re-
sponded to a request for this paragraph 5 mate-
rial by saying, "We will review what state-
ments that we may have on this, and we'll 
advise you by Tuesday as to any statements, 
transcriptions, or notes other than attorney's 
notes that fall within the purview of paragraph 
No. 5." 
As late as March 25, 1977, plaintiffs' counsel 
was still promising to "comply with paragraphs 
5, 10 and 11 in more elaborate style." 
Neither statement fits in well with the assertion 
made in court by plaintiffs' counsel that the 
consistent practice of his office had been to 
avoid reducing to writing any information pro-
vided by witnesses. Assuming that counsel 
was aware of this practice of his own office, 
these statements must be viewed as extremely 
evasive. 
4. The possibility that the plaintiffs have by now 
expended over $24,000 in legal fees and ex-
penditures in this case is, of course, utterly 
without relevance to the matter of counsel's 
compliance with the orders of the court. 
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provides for the dismissal of an action 
where the plaintiff has failed to comply 
with "any order of the court." Dismissal is, 
of course, an extremely harsh sanction. 
The instant case, however, provides a rare 
example of a situation in which such a 
sanction is in fact merited. A review of the 
extensive docket sheet in this case, a copy 
of which is attached hereto, underscores the 
difficulties which this case has already cre-
ated. The conduct of the plaintiffs has 
already necessitated the order referring this 
case to a magistrate. By that order, dated 
December 22, 1976, Magistrate Balog was 
given "the power to impose appropriate 
sanctions upon any party who fails to fully 
cooperate with the magistrate in the formu-
lation of the pretrial order, or who in any 
other way fails to comply with the instant 
order." 
A careful consideration of the record in 
this case, including the briefs of the parties 
and the exhibits introduced with respect to 
the instant motion to dismiss, persuades the 
court that Magistrate Balog was well justi-
fied in recommending the dismissal of the 
instant complaint with prejudice. 
The plaintiffs have also sought leave to 
file their "third amended complaint," as 
well as a commensurate extension of time 
for discovery. 
Under F.R.CW.P. 15(a) a party is entitled 
to only one amended pleading as a matter 
of course. Subsequent amendments are 
permitted "only by leave of court or by 
written consent of the adverse party." The 
determination of the appropriateness of ad-
ditional amended pleadings "is within the 
discretion" of the trial court. Fom&n v. 
Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 
L.Ed.2d 222 (1962) (dictum), cited in Zenith 
5. The original complaint was filed on January 
10, 1975. The first complaint was dismissed on 
March 7, 1975. The first amended complaint 
was dismissed on May 23, 1975. Plaintiffs 
were denied leave to file a proffered second 
amended complaint on October 15, 1975. The 
instant second amended complaint was filed on 
November 3, 1975, and plaintiffs were permit-
ted to reinstate the Village of Barrington HiUs 
as a party defendant on March 10, 1976. The 
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Radio Corp, v. Hazeltine Research, 401 U.S. 
321, 330, 91 S.Ct. 795, 28 L.Ed.2d 77 (1971). 
The court is aware that the spirit of the 
rule is tolerant towards such amendments. 
Rule 15(a) states that "leave shall be freely 
given when justice so requires." A trial 
court is obligated to act in this spirit, and 
may not deny such leave "without any jus-
tifying reason." Foman v. Davis, supra. 
This does not mean, however, that the 
right to amend is absolute. "The require-
ment of judicial approval suggests that 
there are instances where leave should not 
be granted." Klee v. Pittsburgh & W. Va. 
Rwy. Co., 22 F.R.D. 252, 255 (W.D.Pa.1958). 
Foman v. Davis states that leave is inappro-
priate where there is "undue delay, bad 
faith or dilatory motive on the part of the 
movant, repeated failure to cure deficien-
cies by amendments previously allowed, un-
due prejudice to the opposing party by vir-
tue of allowance of the amendment, futility 
of amendment, etc." 371 U.S. at 182, 83 
S.Ct. at 230. In Zenith v. Hazeltine Re-
search, suprat the court stressed that in 
deciding a Rule 15(a) motion "the trial 
court was required to take into account any 
prejudice that Zenith would have suffered 
as a result." 401 U.S. at 331, 91 S.Ct. at 
802. 
The proffered "third amended complaint" 
is in fact the fifth complaint presented by 
these plaintiffs to the court.1 This pleading 
is 93 pages long and consists of 293 para-
graphs. The complaint contains sixty-one 
counts asserted against twenty-five differ-
ent defendants. These defendants include 
individuals previously dismissed from the 
case as well as new parties; in all twenty 
defendants would be added to those pres-
ently in the case.* 
motion for leave to file this complaint was filed 
on May 3, 1977. 
6. The plaintiffs would reinstate their claims 
against various prosecutors, add additional po-
lice defendants, as well as the Sheriff of Lake 
County, and institute claims against a local 
newspaper, and its managing editor-reporter-
photographer. 
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This proffered complaint is submitted 
nearly two and a half years following the 
inception of the case. In determining the 
appropriateness of granting leave, the court 
cannot be oblivious of the record of plain-
tiffs' conduct in this litigation prior to this 
point. When the repeated pleadings, the 
repeated scorn for court orders, the re-
peated requests for extensions of discovery 
are considered, a finding of prejudice to the 
current defendants is ineluctable.7 The dif-
ficulties in bringing this action into a pos-
ture fit for trial have already necessitated 
the dismissal of several complaints, and a 
transfer of this case to the magistrate. The 
introduction of new parties and new factual 
controversies at this point will only exacer-
bate the prior problems. The concomitant 
request for an extension of discovery is a 
red flag as to the undue delay that the 
filing of this complaint would generate.8 
Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that the 
instant (second amended) complaint be dis-
missed with prejudice for the reasons stated 
above. Furthermore, the request of the 
plaintiffs to file a fifth complaint in this 
action is hereby ordered denied. 
s/s Bernard M. Decker 
United States District Judge 
Dated May 13, 1977. 
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7. These defendants are entitled to a prompt 
resolution of the long standing claims against 
them. Of course, the additional prejudice to 
the proposed defendants who have been previ-
ously dismissed from this action is self-evident. 
Michael SUSMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
LINCOLN AMERICAN CORP. et aL, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
Ann FLAMM and Arnold FLAMM, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v. 
Rudolph EBERSTADT, Jr. and MICRO-
DOT, INC., Defendants-Appellees. 
Nos. 78-1293, 78-1310. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Seventh Circuit. 
Argued Sept. 14, 1978. 
Decided Oct. 23, 1978. 
As Amended Nov. 20, 1978. 
Rehearing and Rehearing In Banc 
Denied Dec. 5, 1978. 
The United States District Court for 
the Northern District of Illinois, Joel M. 
Flaum, J., dismissed two class action com-
plaints as moot after the defendants ten-
dered to the named plaintiffs their full 
monetary damages. Appeals were consoli-
dated, and the Court of Appeals, Fairchild, 
Chief Judge, held that: (1) where a motion 
for class certification had been pursued 
with reasonable diligence and was pending 
before the district court, the case did not 
become moot merely because of the tender 
to the named plaintiffs of their individual 
money damages; (2) the district court 
should have heard and decided the motion 
for class certification before deciding 
whether or not the case was mooted by the 
tender of money damages; (3) under Dela-
ware law, a derivative suit for money dam-
ages brought on behalf of one corporation 
and against another could not survive the 
merger of the corporations, and (4) a deriv-
ative suit against third parties commenced 
prior to the merger of corporation on behalf 
8. This court recognized that the undue delaying 
effect of tardy amended pleading requires a 
denial of leave to amend in Forum v. Fidelity & 
Deposit, No. 74 C 3747. 
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doors to all complaining stockholders with-
out requiring them to show that it was 
impossible to obtain redress through regu-
lar corporate action, litigation of this kind 
would be endless." 187 Md. at 192, 49 
A.2d at 453. If substantive opposition 
retroactively excuses demand, why would 
any investor demand action? If the firm 
opposed the suit, then the opposition would 
show the futility of demand; if however 
the firm embraced and prosecuted the 
plaintiffs claim, then the plaintiff would 
receive all the relief the court could have 
awarded. Demand would be defunct. Yet 
Maryland says that demand is the norm. 
It must follow that the directors' substan-
tive opposition does not obviate demand. 
For the reasons given in our initial opin-
ion, 908 F.2d at 1347-50, the district court's 
judgment is reversed to the extent it held 
that Kamen is not entitled to pursue a 
direct action under § 36(b) of the Invest-
ment Company Act. The Supreme Court 
denied the Fund's petition for certiorari to 
review that aspect of our decision, — U.S. 
, 111 S.Ct 558, 112 LEd.2d 565 (1990), 
as it denied Kamen's petition to the extent 
it sought review of our holding, 908 F.2d at 
1350-51, that she is not entitled to a jury 
trial of her claim under § 36(b), — U.S. 
, 111 S.Ct. 554,112 L.Ed.2d 561 (1990). 
The case is remanded for further proceed-
ings under § 36(b). The judgment is af-
firmed to the extent it holds that Kamen's 
failure to make a demand on the Fund's 
directors blocks a derivative action under 
§ 20(a). 
Marie PERKINS and George Gaynor, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
• . 
Marshall SILVERSTEIN, individually 
and in his capacity as an administrator 
for the Cook County Forest Preserve 
District, George Dunne, individually 
and in his capacity as a President and 
Commissioner for the Cook County 
SILVERSTEIN 463 
465 (7th Cir. 1991) 
Forest Preserve District, Steve Castans, 
individually and in his capacity as 
Chief of the Cook County Forest Pre-
serve District Police Department, Chris 
Siragusa, individually and in his capac-
ity as a Lieutenant for the Cook Coun-
ty Forest Preserve District, John Gab-
hart, individually and in his capacity as 
an administrator for the Cook County 
Forest Preserve District, James Gau-
ghan, individually and in his capacity 
as an administrator for the Cook Coun-
ty Forest Preserve District, Lewis Kor-
tas, individually and in his capacity as 
a Sergeant for the Cook County Forest 
Preserve District, Edward Connelly, in-
dividually and in his capacity as a 
Lieutenant for the Cook County Forest 
Preserve District, Bruce Quintos, indi-
vidually and in his capacity as a Lieu-
tenant for the Cook County Forest Pre-
serve District, G. Palacios, individually 
and in his capacity as a Lieutenant for 
the Cook County Forest Preserve Dis-
trict, Sgt. Lawrence, individually and in 
his capacity as a Sergeant for the Cook 
County Forest Preserve District, Greg 
Kinczewski, individually and in his ca-
pacity as an attorney for the Cook 
County Forest Preserve District and 
Cook County Civil Service Commission, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
No. 90-1481. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Seventh Circuit. 
Argued Dec. 5, 1990. 
Decided Aug. 7, 1991. 
Former probationary police officers 
brought employment discrimination suit 
following their discharge. The United 
States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois, Eastern Division, Suzanne 
B. Conlon, J., dismissed complaint, and offi-
cers appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Grant, Senior District Judge, sitting by des-
ignation, held that allegations in original 
and amended complaint failed to state any 
claims upon which relief could be granted. 
Affirmed. 
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1. Federal Civil Procedure *=»674 
Even under liberal notice pleading, 
complaint must identify grounds upon 
which claims are based. Fed.Rules Civ. 
ProcRule 8(a), 28 U.S.C.A. 
2. Federal Courts *=>713 
General reference to "pleadings and 
affidavits" contained in plaintiffs' appen-
dix, in place of statement of facts, improp-
erly shifted plaintiffs' burden of pleading 
to the court F.R.A.P.Rule 28(a)(3), 28 U.S. 
C.A. 
3. Federal Civil Procedure «=>629 
Newspaper articles, commentaries and 
editorial cartoons attached to complaint re-
ferring to sex-for-jobs scandal were not the 
type of documentary evidence or "written 
instruments]" which Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure intended to be incorporated into, 
and made part of, the complaint. Fed. 
Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 10(c), 28 U.S.C.A. 
4. Civil Rights <*=>375 
Probationary officer's complaint aris-
ing out of her discharge failed to state 
claim for sexual harassment; complaint al-
leged "unwelcome sexual advances, unwel-
come requests for sexual favors and other 
unwelcome verbal and physical conduct of 
a sexual nature," but failed to identify any 
specific incidents of harassment, when 
these "unwelcome advances" occurred, or 
identify what the "terms, conditions and 
privileges" of her employment were or how 
they were affected. Civil Rights Act of 
1964, § 701 et seq., 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et 
seq. 
5. Civil Rights «=>235(5) 
Probationary police officers' complaint 
charging due process and equal protection 
violations, but failing to identify any prop-
erty or liberty interest or any prior or 
subsequent history of disparate treatment 
failed to state claim under § 1983. 42 U.S. 
C.A. § 1983. 
6. Conspiracy *=>18 
Probationary officers failed to state 
§ 1985 and 1986 claims arising out of their 
discharge, where officers failed to identify 
any protected property or liberty interest in 
employment or show meeting of minds be-
tween alleged conspirators. 42 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 1985, 1986. 
7. Civil Rights *=>235(5) 
Probationary officers stated no due 
process claim under Illinois law arising out 
of their discharge, absent citation to stat-
utes, rule or regulation which would entitle 
them to hearing before county civil service 
commission in connection with discharge or 
to continued employment. 
8. Civil Rights e=>375 
Probationary officer's failure to allege 
compliance with administrative filing re-
quirements of ADEA warranted dismissal 
of claim. Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act of 1967, § 7(d), 29 U.S.C.A. 
§ 626(d). 
9. Civil Rights «=»235(3j 
Probationary officers alleged no facts 
showing that individual defendants acted 
pursuant to municipal policy or custom in 
discharging them or that such actions 
caused them to be deprived of constitution-
al right, as required to support claim 
against such defendants in their official 
capacities. 
10. Civil Rights e=>362 
Administrative filing requirements im-
posed under Title VII and ADEA are not 
jurisdictional prerequisites which pose ab-
solute bar to suit, but rather conditions 
precedent, similar to statutes of limitation, 
which are subject to equitable modification. 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701 et seq., 
706(d), (e)(1), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 2000e et seq., 2000e-5(e), (f)(1); Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 
§ 7(d), 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(d). 
11. Administrative Law and Procedure 
«=>456 
Civil Rights ©=362 
Completion of Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission (EEOC) intake ques-
tionnaire did not constitute charge for pur-
poses of ADEA administrative filing re-
quirement, where plaintiff was informed by 
EEOC at time he completed intake ques-
tionnaire that there was insufficient infor-
mation to support his claim of retaliation 
and that no further action would be taken 
PERKINS v. SILVERSTEIN 465 
Cite as 939 F-2d 463 (7th Clr. 1991) 
on the basis of the questionnaire. Age and was obviously deficient. Fed.Rules 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Civ.Proc.Rule 15(a), 28 U.S.C.A. 
§ 7(d), 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(d). 
12. Federal Civil Procedure *»849 
Generally, complaint may not be 
amended by briefs in opposition to motion 
to dismiss. 
13. Administrative Law and Procedure 
*=*73 
Civil Rights *=>364 
Official not named in Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 
charge could not be sued under Title VII. 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706(d), (e)(1), as 
amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(e), (fXl). 
14. Civil Rights «=>367 
Receipt of right-to-sue letter after com-
plaint had been filed, but before it had been 
dismissed, effectively cured deficiency in 
original complaint. 
15. Federal Civil Procedure *=>825 
Plaintiffs right to amend as a matter 
of course survives motion to dismiss. 
16. Federal Civil Procedure e»825 
Probationary officer effectively used 
up her right to amend as a matter of 
course following dismissal when she at-
tempted to amend complaint to include 
right-to-sue letter, and any further amend-
ment required leave of court, but even if 
she had retained right to amend as a mat-
ter of course, that right was not absolute. 
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 15(a), 28 U.S.C.A. 
17. Federal Civil Procedure *=>851 
Following dismissal of complaint, dis-
trict court may deny leave to amend if 
proposed amendment fails to cure deficien-
cies in original pleading, or could not sur-
vive second motion to dismiss. Fed.Rules 
Civ.Proc.Rule 15(a), 28 U.S.C.A. 
18. Federal Civil Procedure *=>851 
Following dismissal of probationary of-
ficer's original complaint, district court 
properly denied leave to file amended com-
plaint which added nothing of substance 
* The Honorable Robert A. Grant, Senior District 
Judge for the Northern District of Indiana, is 
Peter J. O'Malley (argued), Chicago, 111., 
for plaintiffs-appellants. 
Alison E. O'Hara (argued), Office of 
Atty. Gen., Civ. Appeals Div., Lawrence J. 
Suffredin, R. Matthew Simon, Simon & Spi-
talli, Chicago, III, for defendant-appellee 
Marshall Silverstein. 
Lawrence J. Suffredin, R. Matthew Si-
mon, Simon & Spitalli, Chicago, 111., for 
defendants-appellees George W. Dunne, 
Steve Castans, Chris Siragusa, John Gab-
hart, James Gaughan, Lewis Kortas, Ed-
ward Connelly, Bruce Quintos, G. Palacios, 
Sgt. Lawrence and Greg Kinczewski. 
Iris E. Sholder, Office of State's Atty. of 
Cook County, Chicago, 111., for defendant-
appellee Cook County Civ. Service Com'n. 
Before COFFEY and KANNE, Circuit 
Judges, and GRANT, Senior District 
Judge.* 
GRANT, Senior District Judge. 
Plaintiffs Marie Perkins and George Gay-
nor, former probationary police officers for 
the Cook County Forest Preserve District 
Police Department, filed a sixteen count 
employment discrimination suit against 
several members of the Department, defen-
dants Castans, Siragusa, Kortas, Connelly, 
Quintos, Palacios and Lawrence, two mem-
bers of the District's administration, defen-
dants Gabhart and Gaughan, the President 
of the Forest Preserve District, George 
Dunne, the District's Chief Executive Offi-
cer, Marshall Silverstein, its attorney, Greg 
Kinczewski, and the Cook County Civil Ser-
vice Commission alleging violations of Title 
VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.t the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.t the Civil 
Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 
1985,1986, and unidentified state law. The 
district court dismissed the complaint in its 
entirety under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and (6), 
sitting by designation. 
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and denied Perkins* belated motion to 
amend. This appeal followed. For the fol-
lowing reasons, we now affirm the judg-
ment of the district court. 
I. PRIOR PROCEEDINGS 
The Commission was named as a defen-
dant in only two counts of the complaint, 
both alleging violations of procedural due 
process under state law. Plaintiffs alleged 
that they had a right under the Commis-
sion's Rules and Regulations to have the 
decisions to terminate their employment re-
viewed by the 'Commission, and that that 
right was violated. The Commission filed a 
motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 
12(bX6) contending that there was no provi-
sion for the type of administrative appeal 
which plaintiffs sought. The district court 
agreed, citing Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 34, § 1114 
and Civil Service Commission Rule IX, Sec. 
12 which give the appointing officer or the 
executive officer in the department in 
which an officer is employed the authority 
to discharge a probationary employee, with 
the consent of the Commission, "upon as-
signing in writing to [the] Commission his 
reasons therefor/' and granted the Com-
mission's motion to dismiss. 
Taking their cue from the Commission, 
the individual defendants moved to dismiss 
the remaining counts of the complaint. On 
July 24, 1989, the district court granted 
that motion and issued a detailed memoran-
dum opinion citing various defects in the 
complaint. It dismissed plaintiffs' Title 
VII and ADEA claims for lack of jurisdic-
tion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(bXl), finding 
that plaintiffs had failed to allege compli-
ance with the "jurisdictional prerequisites" 
of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e*-5(e) and (fXD and 29 
US.C. § 626(d). The §§ 1983 and 1985 
claims were found to be insufficient be-
cause plaintiffs failed to identify a protect-
ed property or liberty interest in their em-
ployment, Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 
U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct 2701, 2709, 33 
L.Ed.2d 548 (1972); Bishop v. Wood, 426 
U.S. 341, 348, 96 S.Ct 2074, 2079, 48 
L.Ed.2d 684 (1976), or to allege facte, which 
if true, would establish the existence of a 
conspiracy among the defendants. Rodg-
ers v. Lincoln Towing Service, Inc., 596 
F.Supp. IS, 21 (N.D.Ill.1984), ajfd, 771 
F.2d 194 (7th Cir.1985). Absent a viable 
claim under § 1985, the court concluded 
there could be no claim under § 1986. 
Williams v. St. Joseph Hospital, 629 F.2d 
448, 452 (7th Cir.1980). Plaintiffs' pendent 
state due process claims were found to be 
equally lacking in that they failed to iden-
tify any basis for plaintiffs' assertion of a 
right to continued employment with the 
Department or to cite any statute, rule or 
regulation which would have entitled them 
to any process beyond that already re-
ceived. 
We concur with the district court with 
respect to all but the Title VII and ADEA 
claims, and find any error in the disposition 
of those claims to be harmless. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In determining the propriety of dismissal 
under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the district 
court is bound by the same standard which 
binds this court on appeal. It must accept 
as true all well-pled factual allegations in 
the complaint and draw all r- i^sonable in-
ferences therefrom in favor of the plaintiff. 
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 
S.Ct. 1683,1686, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974); Cor-
coran v. Chicago Park District, 875 F.2d 
609, 611 (7th Cir.1989); Gomez v. Illinois 
State Board of Education, 811 F.2d 1030, 
1032-33 (7th Cir.1987). If it appears be-
yond doubt that plaintiffs can prove any 
set of facts consistent with the allegations 
in the complaint which would entitle them 
to relief, dismissal is inappropriate. Hi-
shon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 
104 S.Ct 2229, 2232, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984); 
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 
S.Ct 99, 101-102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Illi-
nois Health Care Ass'n v. Illinois Dept. of 
Public Health, 879 F.2d 286, 288 (7th Cir. 
1989). They may not avoid dismissal, how-
ever, simply by attaching bare legal conclu-
sions to narrated facts which fail to outline 
the bases of their claims. Sutliff, Inc. v. 
Donovan Companies, 727 F.2d 648, 654 
(7th Cir.1984); see also, Gomez, 811 F.2d at 
1033 (court not bound by plaintiffs' legal 
characterization of the facts); Strauss v. 
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City of Chicago, 760 F.2d 765, 767-68 (7th 
Cir.1985) (absence of any facts to support 
plaintiffs claim renders allegations mere 
legal conclusions subject to dismissal). 
If the district court found it difficult to 
apply this standard in the present case, we 
sympathize. It was an onerous task. The 
complaint lacks material factual allega-
tions, contains a tedious repetition of legal 
conclusions, and improperly joins the plain-
tiffs' claims in a single action. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Sufficiency of the Allegations 
[1,2] To suggest that the factual alle-
gations in plaintiffs' complaint were not 
"well-pled" is an understatement. While 
plaintiffs make clear in their original com-
plaint what their claims are, they fail to 
identify the grounds upon which their 
claims are based.1 This they must do, even 
under the liberal notice pleading of Rule 
8(a). Conley, 355 U.S. at 47, 78 S.Ct at 
102. In place of particularized factual alle-
gations, plaintiffs assault us with general 
statements of the law which were lifted 
verbatim from federal statutes, regulations 
and case law dealing with employment dis-
crimination, i.e., "quid pro quo harass-
ment," "hostile work environment," "un-
welcome sexual advances," "age discrimi-
nation," "wrongful termination," "equal 
protection," "due process," and "conspir-
acy." See Sutliff, Inc., 727 F.2d at 654 
(complaint which merely recites statutory 
language and related legalese but fails to 
allege minimal material factual allegations 
outlining violation of the law insufficient). 
Apparently reading Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(c) as 
a license to plead their case by exhibit, 
plaintiffs attached an assortment of letters, 
1. The absence of any factual background is also 
evident in plaintiffs' appellate brief. In place of 
the statement of facts mandated by Fed.R. 
App.P, 28(a)(3), we find a general reference to 
the "pleadings and affidavits" contained in 
plaintiffs' appendix. We strongly disapprove of 
this tactic. See Skagen v. Sears, Roebuck £ Co., 
910 F.2d 1498, 1500 n. 2 (7th Cir.1990). It 
improperly shirts the plaintiffs' burden of plead-
ing to the courts, and imposes upon us the 
time-consuming job of reconstructing the facts. 
In the present case, the facts with which we 
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newspaper articles, commentaries, cartoons 
and miscellaneous other exhibits to their 
Complaint, leaving it to the court to extract 
the relevant facts. To the extent plaintiffs 
rely on this haphazard compilation to fill 
the void left in their complaint, their re-
liance is misplaced. The exhibits show that 
there were non-discriminatory reasons for 
terminating plaintiffs' employment; that 
plaintiffs were accorded a full-adversary 
pre-termination hearing; and that they 
were discharged on the basis of a hearing 
board's recommendation and, in Perkins' 
case, the decision of the President of the 
District, defendant George Dunne. It is 
difficult, if not impossible, to see how these 
facts, and those which follow, favor the 
plaintiffs' case. 
1. Perkins 
According to the exhibits, Perkins at-
tempted suicide on March 24, 1988, and 
was consequently charged with a violation 
of Department Rule 15.20 which prohibits 
officers from engaging in any activities, on 
or off duty, "which indicate instability of 
character or personality," and "give the 
appearance of impropriety." The hearing 
originally scheduled for April 6, 1988 was 
continued at Perkins' request, or on her 
behalf, until June 23, 1988. 
[3] In late April, 1988, the Chicago me-
dia featured defendant Dunne as the sub-
ject of a sex-for-jobs scandal.2 Perkins' 
role in the scandal is unclear. While she 
apparently made a public disclosure of the 
fact that she and Dunne had, at some un-
identified point in time, engaged in a sexual 
relationship, she later denied any connec-
tion between their relationship and her job 
with the Department. 
were provided prove far more beneficial to the 
defendants than the plaintiffs. 
2. The newspaper articles, commentaries and ed-
itorial cartoons which Perkins attached to the 
complaint referencing this "scandal," are not the 
type of documentary evidence or "written in-
strument[s]M which Fed.RXiv.P. 10(c) intended 
to be incorporated into, and made a part of, the 
complaint. See generally, Wright & Miller, Fed-
eral Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 1327, p. 
763 and n. 7 (2d ed. 1990). 
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A Hearing Board comprised of defen-
dants Siragusa, Gabhart and Gaughan con-
vened on June 23,1988 to hear the charges 
stemming from the attempted suicide. At 
the conclusion of the evidence, the Board 
unanimously agreed that Perkins* conduct 
indicated instability of character, gave the 
appearance of impropriety, and "threat-
ened] in the future the safety of herself, 
her fellow officers, and the public." The 
Board recommended termination^ and 
Dunne, as President of the District, made 
the final discharge decision. 
[4] On the basis of these "facts," Per-
kins concludes that she was the victim of 
"quid pro quo sexual harassment" and a 
"hostile work environment." She alleges 
that Silverstein and Dunne subjected her to 
"unwelcome sexual advances, unwelcome 
requests for sexual favors and other un-
welcome verbal and physical conduct of a 
sexual nature," and that the defendants' 
conduct "substantially affected the terms, 
conditions, and privileges of [her] employ-
ment," but fails to identify any specific 
incidents of harassment, to tell us when 
these "unwelcome advances" occurred, or 
to identify what the "terms, conditions and 
privileges" of her employment were, or 
how they were affected. 
[5-7] In her § 1983 claims, Perkins 
charges Silverstein and Dunne with violat-
ing the due process and equal protection 
clauses of the fourteenth amendment, but 
fails to identify any property or liberty 
interest in her employment or to allege any 
prior or subsequent history of disparate 
treatment Her §§ 1985 and 1986 claims 
are premised on an alleged conspiracy to 
deprive her of rights and privileges accord-
ed her under the fourteenth amendment 
and Title VII, but again fail to identify any 
protected property or liberty interest in her 
employment or to show a meeting of the 
minds between the alleged coconspirators. 
We also note that to the extent these 
claims are premised on a violation of rights 
created by Title VII, they are in direct 
conflict with Great American Federal 
Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 
U.S. 366, 378, 99 S.Ct 2345, 2352, 60 
L.Ed.2d 957 (1979). The pendent state due 
process allegations are also insufficient. 
Perkins cites no statute, rule or regulation 
which would entitle her to a hearing before 
the Commission in connection with her dis-
charge, or to continued employment with 
the Department. 
2. Gaynor 
In Gaynor's case, the exhibits show that 
he was the subject of at least five written 
reports between July 21, 1988 and August 
20, 1988 in which his conduct or perform-
ance as a police officer was questioned by 
his superior officers, defendants Palacios, 
Lawrence and Quintos. The incident which 
ultimately led to Gaynor's termination oc-
curred on August 28, 1988. While on duty 
with another officer, Gaynor engaged in a 
conversation in which he made several de-
rogatory remarks about the Department 
and his superiors and stated that he would 
be willing to falsify information on a police 
report. Unknown to Gaynor, the radio in 
the squad car was "keyed up" and the 
conversation was broadcast over the air-
waves, recorded at the station and was 
overheard by a supervisor, defendant Quin-
tos. Gaynor was subsequently charged 
with violating Department Rule 14.9 which 
provides: 
Any officer of the Department who shall 
in the performance of his/her official 
duties display reluctance to properly per-
form his/her assigned duties, or who 
act[s] in a manner tending to bring dis-
credit upon themself or the Department, 
or who fails to assume responsibility or 
exercise diligence, intelligence, and inter-
est in the pursuit of their duties, or 
whose actions or performance in a posi-
tion, rank or assignment are below ac-
ceptable standards, may be deemed in-
competent and shall be subject to dis-
missal from the Department 
(Emphasis added). 
On September 16,1988, a Formal Inquiry 
Board comprised of defendants Castans, 
Gabhart, and Connelly convened to hear 
the charges against Gaynor, and his de-
fense thereto The Board concluded on the 
basis of the evidence presented that Gay-
nor was guilty of violating Department 
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Rules 14.9, 18.12 and 18.14,* and requested 
that he be terminated. 
Gaynor alleges in his complaint that he 
was 56 years old "at the time of his em-
ployment"; that he was performing his 
duties as a police officer in a reasonably 
proficient manner;4 and, that defendants 
Silverstein, Castans, Gabhart, Gaughan, 
Quintos, Palacios, and Lawrence initiated 
disciplinary proceedings against him as "a 
pretext to the discriminatory motive of age 
discrimination." He alleges that his 
"wrongful termination" and replacement 
by a "non-civil service temporary appointee 
office" constituted a violation of the 
ADEA. Gaynor's due process allegations 
are virtually identical to Perkins'. He chal-
lenges his termination under § 1983 and 
unidentified state law, contending that he 
was deprived of a protected liberty and 
property interest in "completing his proba-
tionary period as a police officer and there-
by obtaining full Civil Service status"; that 
he was "stigmatized and prevented] from 
obtaining future employment"; and, that 
he was denied the opportunity to have the 
real reasons for his termination heard by 
the Commission. His claims under 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986 are premised on 
an alleged conspiracy among the defen-
dants to knowingly deprive him of "rights 
and privileges" protected under the ADEA 
and the fourteenth amendment, and their 
failure to prevent that deprivation. 
[8] Gaynor's §§ 1983, 1985, 1986 and 
pendent state claims are, in almost all re-
spects, identical to those we found insuffi-
cient in Perkins' case. Gaynor fails to 
identify a protected property or liberty in-
terest in his employment, to show a meet-
ing of the minds between the alleged cocon-
spirators, or to cite any statute, rule or 
regulation which would entitle him to a 
hearing before the Commission in connec-
tion with his discharge, or to continued 
employment with the Department The 
3. Department Rule 18.12 is neglect of duty. 
Rule 18.14 is inattention to duty. 
4. Gaynor alleges that "he met the reasonable 
proficiency standards for the performance of 
his duties as a police officer N The exhibits, 
which he attached to the complaint, show other-
wise. In determining the sufficiency of the 
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substantive deficiencies in his ADEA alle-
gations are too numerous to count. We 
need cite but one, Gaynor's failure to allege 
compliance with the administrative filing 
requirements of 29 U.S.C. § 626(d), to find 
that dismissal of the ADEA claim and any 
claim premised thereon was warranted. 
S. "Official Capacity" 
[9] To the extent plaintiffs seek dam-
ages against the defendants in their official 
capacities, their complaint is in effect an 
action against Cook County, a municipality. 
See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 
165-66,105 S.Ct. 3099, 3104-05, 87 L.Ed.2d 
114 (1985); Leahy v. Board of Trustees of 
Community College District No. 508, 912 
P.2d 917, 922 (7th Cir.1990). To support 
such a claim, the plaintiffs must allege 
facts, which if true, would show that the 
defendants acted pursuant to a municipal 
policy or custom when they discharged the 
plaintiffs, and that such actions caused 
them to be deprived of a right protected by 
the Constitution. Graham, 473 U.S. at 
166, 105 S.Ct. at 3105; Oklahoma City v. 
Tuttle, All U.S. 808, 817-18, 105 S.Ct. 
2427, 2432-33, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985); Mo-
nell v. Department of Social Services of 
the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 
S.Ct. 2018, 2037, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). 
They have done neither. 
B. The Title VII and ADEA Claims 
110] In dismissing plaintiffs' Title VII 
and ADEA claims, the district court errone-
ously concluded that 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-5(e), (fXD and 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) 
were "jurisdictional prerequisites." They 
are not Since Zipes v. Trans World Air-
lines, Inc., 455 V.S. 385, 393, 102 S.Ct 
1127, 1132, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982) and 
Stearns v. Consolidated Management, 
Inc., 747 F.2d 1105, 1111 (7th Cir.1984), we 
have consistently held that the administra-
complaint we must rely on the exhibits whenev-
er the allegations of the complaint are material-
ly inconsistent with those exhibits. See Foshee 
v. Daoust Construction Co., 185 F.2d 23, 25 (7th 
Cir. 1950); Wright & Miller, Federal Practice 
and Procedure: Civil 2d § 1327, pp. 766-67. 
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tive filing requirements imposed under Ti-
tle VII and the ADEA are not ''jurisdiction-
al prerequisites" which pose an absolute 
bar to suit, but rather "conditions prece-
dent/' similar to statutes of limitations, 
which are subject to equitable modification. 
Stark v. Dynascan Corp., 902 F.2d 549, 
551 (7th Cir.1990) (ADEA); Schnellbaecher 
v. Baskin Clothing Co., 887 F.2d 124, 126 
(7th Cir.1989) (Title VII); Smith v. General 
Scanning, Inc., 876 F.2d 1315, 1317 (7th 
Cir.1989) (ADEA); Anooya v. Hilton Hotel 
Corp., 733 F.2d 48, 49 (7th Cir.1984) (Title 
VII). 
[11] In Gaynor's case, the distinction is 
immaterial. He neither alleges compliance 
with § 626(d),5 nor demonstrates an eq-
uitable basis for modifying the require-
ments set out therein. In an affidavit in 
response to the motion to dismiss, Gaynor 
attempts to argue that his completion of an 
EEOC intake questionnaire satisfies the re-
quirements of § 626(d). The district court 
disagreed, as do we. In Steffen v. Meridi-
an Life Ins. Co., 859 F.2d 534, 544 (7th 
Cir.1988), cert denied, 491 U.S. 907, 109 
S.Ct. 3191, 105 L.Ed.2d 699 (1989), we held 
that an intake questionnaire may, under 
certain circumstances, constitute a charge 
for purposes of the ADEA administrative 
filing requirements, i.e., where the informa-
tion contained in the questionnaire was suf-
ficient to constitute a charge, and both the 
claimant and EEOC indicated that they 
would treat the questionnaire as a charge. 
See also Phxlbin v. General Electric Capi-
tal Auto Lease, Inc., 929 F.2d 321, 324-25 
(7th Cir.1991). Those circumstances are 
not present in this case. Gaynor acknowl-
edges in his affidavit that he was informed 
by the EEOC at the time he completed the 
intake questionnaire that there was insuffi-
cient information to support his claim of 
5. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) provides: 
No civil action may be commenced by an 
individual under [the ADEA] until 60 days 
after a charge alleging unlawful discrimina-
tion has been hied with the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission. Such a 
charge shall be hied 
6. As a general rule, a complaint may not be 
amended by briefs in opposition to a motion to 
dismiss Thomason v. Nachtneb, 888 F.2d 1202, 
retaliation and that no further action would 
be taken on the basis of the questionnaire. 
(12] The distinction, however, is far 
more significant in Perkins* case. 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) and (f)(1) provide in 
relevant part as follows: 
(e) A charge under this section shall be 
filed within one hundred and eighty days 
after the alleged unlawful employment 
practice occurred and notice of the 
charge (including the date, place and cir-
cumstances of the alleged unlawful em-
ployment practice) shall be served upon 
the person against whom such charge is 
made within ten days thereafter 
(f)(1).... If a charge filed with the 
Commission . . . is dismissed by the Com-
mission, or if within one hundred and 
eighty days from the filing of such 
charge or the expiration of any period of 
reference under subsection (c) or (d) of 
this section, whichever is later, the Com-
mission has not filed a civil action under 
this section . . . [or] has not entered into 
a conciliation agreement to which the 
person aggrieved is a party, the Commis-
sion .. shall so notify the person ag-
grieved and within ninety days after the 
giving of such notice a civil action may 
be brought against the respondent 
named in the charge [] by the person 
claiming to be aggrieved 
Perkins failed to allege compliance with 
either of these filing requirements in her 
original complaint. The omission was not 
inadvertent. Perkins did not have a right-
to-sue letter when she filed her complaint, 
and had not named Dunne in the adminis-
trative charge which she filed with the 
EEOC. She attempted to cure both over-
sights in her response to the defendants' 
motion to dismiss.* She had, by that time, 
procured a right-to-sue letter from the 
1205 (7th Cir.1989); Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford 
Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1107 (7th Cir.1984), 
cert, denied, 470 VS 1054, 105 S.Ct. 1758, 84 
LEd.2d 821 (1985). In the present case, how-
ever, the district court appears to have deemed 
the exhibits attached to the plaintiffs' opposition 
bnef to be a part of the complaint, and con-
sidered those exhibits in reviewing the sufficien-
cy of the complaint. 
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EEOC which she attached to her response 
brief. With respect to defendant Dunne, 
she argued that Silverstein had been 
named in the EEOC charge and that notice 
to Silverstein constituted notice to Dunne 
since they were both administrators of the 
Forest Preserve District 
[13] To the extent Perkins alleges any 
violation of Title VII by Dunne, the district 
court correctly concluded that her claims 
are barred by 42 U.S.C. § 2000«-5(f)(l). 
Perkins does not dispute the fact that 
George Dunne was not named in the 
charge which she filed with the EEOC. 
Her public denial of any connection be-
tween her relationship with Dunne and her 
job with the Department suggests a rea-
sonable explanation for that omission. 
Neither has she alleged any facts which 
warrant an exception to the general rule 
that a party not named in the EEOC charge 
cannot be sued under Title VII. See 
Schnellbaecher, 887 F.2d at 126-27; Eggle-
ston v. Chicago Journeymen Plumbers1 
Local Union No. 130, U.A., 657 F.2d 890, 
905 (7th Cir.1981), cert denied, 455 U.S. 
1017,102 S.Ct. 1710, 72 L.Ed.2d 134 (1982); 
LeBeau v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 484 
F.2d 798, 799 (7th Cir.1973). 
[14] The disposition of Perkins1 Title 
VII claims against Silverstein is not quite 
so simple. While they may have been sub-
ject to dismissal at any time prior to Per-
kins' receipt of a right-to-sue letter, the 
receipt of that letter after the complaint 
had been filed, but before it had been dis-
missed, effectively cured the deficiency in 
the original complaint Williams v. Wash-
ington Metro. Area Transit Authority, 
721 F.2d 1412, 1418 n. 12 (D.C.Cir.1983); 
Fouche v. Jekyll Island-State Park Au-
thority, 713 F.2d 1518, 1525 (11th Cir. 
1983); Perdue v. Roy Stone Transfer 
Corp., 690 F.2d 1091, 1093 (4th Cir.1982); 
Pinkard v. Pullman-Standard, a Divi-
sion of Pullman, Inc., 678 F.2d 1211,1218 
(5th Cir.1982) (per curiam), cert denied, 
459 U.S. 1105,103 S.Ct 729, 74 L.Ed.2d 954 
(1983); Clanton v. Orleans Parish School 
Board, 649 F.2d 1084, 1095 n. 13 (5th Cir. 
1981); Henderson v. Eastern Freight 
Ways, Inc., 460 F.2d 258, 260 (4th Cir.1972) 
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(per curiam), cert, denied, 410 U.S. 912, 93 
S.Ct. 976, 35 LEd.2d 275 (1973). Had the 
Title VII allegations been sufficient in all 
other respects, reversal would have been 
warranted and Perkins would have been 
afforded the opportunity to amend her 
complaint to show compliance with the stat-
ute. They were not. As our previous dis-
cussion clearly indicates, Perkins* Title VII 
claims were subject to dismissal for rea-
sons totally unrelated to jurisdiction. 
C. The Motion to Amend 
Although the district court clearly antici-
pated that the plaintiffs might attempt to 
amend their pleadings following dismissal, 
four months elapsed before Perkins filed 
her motion for leave to amend and supple-
ment her portion of the complaint The 
motion provided no explanation or excuse 
for the delay. The allegations of the pro-
posed amended complaint mirror those of 
the first in several respects, expand the 
federal and state due process allegations to 
include specific citations to Illinois law and 
the Commission's Rules, and add a claim 
under the first amendment. 
Citing the untimeliness of the amend-
ment and its failure to cure deficiencies 
previously identified, the district court de-
nied leave to amend. On appeal, Perkins 
contends that she had an absolute right to 
amend her complaint as a matter of course 
under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a), and that the dis-
trict court erred in summarily denying her 
that right. We disagree. 
[15-17] While a plaintiffs right to 
amend as a matter of course survives a 
motion to dismiss, Car Carriers, Inc. v. 
Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1111 (7th 
Cir.1984), cert denied, 470 U.S. 1054, 105 
S.Ct. 1758, 84 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985), Perkins 
effectively used up that right when she 
made her first attempt to amend the com-
plaint to include the right-to-sue letter. 
Any further amendment required leave of 
court under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a), the grant or 
denial of which was subject to the court's 
discretion. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazel-
tine Research, 401 US. 321, 330, 91 S.Ct. 
795, 802, 28 L.Ed.2d 77 (1971); Amendola 
v. Bayer, 907 F.2d 760, 764 (7th Cir.1990). 
Even if Perkins had retained a right to 
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amend as a matter of course, that right 
was not absolute. Williams v. US. Postal 
Service, 873 F.2d 1069, 1072 (7th Cir.1989); 
Textor v. Board of Regents of Northern 
Illinois University, 711 F.2d 1387, 1391 
and n. 1 (7th Cir.1983), Sarfaty v. Nowak, 
369 F.2d 256, 259 (7th Cir.1966), cert de-
nied, 387 U.S. 909, 87 S.Ct 1691, 18 
L.Ed.2d 627 (1967). Under either circum-
stance, a district court may deny leave to 
amend if the proposed amendment fails to 
cure the deficiencies in the original plead-
ing, or could not survive a second motion to 
dismiss. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 
182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 230, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962); 
Glick v. Koenig, 766 FJ2d 265, 268-69 (7th 
Cir.1985); Wakeen v. Hoffman House, 
Inc., 724 F.2d 1238, 1244 (7th Cir.1983); 
Textor, 711 F.2d at 1391 and n. 1; Jafree v. 
Barber, 689 F.2d 640, 644 (7th Cir.1982); 
Asher v. Harrington, 461 F.2d 890, 895 
(7th Cir.1972). To hold otherwise would 
impose upon the defendants and the courts 
the arduous task of responding to an obvi-
ously futile gesture on the part of the 
plaintiffs. Rule 15(a) does not require the 
courts to undertake such an exercise. 
Glick, 766 F.2d at 268-69. 
[18] While the amended complaint is 
significantly longer than the first, it adds 
nothing of any substance. Perkins repeats 
her Title VII allegations against Dunne, 
ignoring the fact that she failed to name 
him in the EEOC charge. See Schnell-
baecher, 887 F.2d at 126-27 (as a general 
rule a party not named in the EEOC charge 
cannot be sued under Title VII). Her Title 
VII allegations against Silverstein remain 
vague and conclusory. Her attempts to 
bolster her due process arguments with 
actual citations to Illinois law and the Com-
mission's Rules ignore the express lan-
guage of Ill.Rev.Stat ch. 34, § 1118 which 
gives the appointing officers or executive 
head of the Department the right to dis-
charge a probationary employee without 
reference to the procedures provided for 
the removal, discharge or suspension of 
non-probationary classified service employ-
ees.7 Under Illinois law and the Commis-
7. Section 1118 provides in pertinent part: 
Any officer or employee serving his or her 
probationary penod may be discharged by 
the appointing officers or the executive head 
sion's Rules, the appointing officer may 
discharge a probationary employee, with 
the consent of the Commission, upon as-
signing in writing to the Commission the 
reasons therefor. Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 34, 
§ 1114 and Commission Rule IX, Sec. 12. 
Perkins' contention on appeal that the Com-
mission was required to consent to the rea-
sons for the discharge is directly contra-
dicted by Alberty v. Daniel, 25 Ill.App.3d 
291, 323 N.E.2d 110 (1974) (Commission 
required to consent only to the discharge, 
not as to the reason). Perkins expands her 
§ 1983 claim to add allegations of a first 
amendment violation, but fails to supply us 
with anything more than conclusory legal 
allegations, or to explain why the court 
should allow her to assert an additional 
claim almost a year after the original com-
plaint was filed. The allegations of a con-
spiracy in her §§ 1985 and 1986 claims are 
totally unsupported by any facts. See 
Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Service, Inc., 
596 F.Supp. 13, 21 (N.D.I11.1984), affd, 111 
F.2d 194 (7th Cir.1985). As the district 
court correctly noted, there can be no cause 
of action under § 1986 absent a viable 
§ 1985 claim. Williams v. St. Joseph Hos-
pital, 629 F.2d 448, 452 (7th Cir.1980). 
Granting leave to file an amended com-
plaint which is so obviously deficient would 
indeed have been an exercise in futility, 
and could have potentially subjected plain-
tiffs and their counsel to Rule 11 sanctions. 
We will not require a district court to in-
dulge in such futile gestures. Glick, 766 
F.2d at 268-69. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The allegations of the original and 
amended complaint fail to state any claims 
upon which relief could be granted. The 
judgment of the district court dismissing 
plaintiffs' cause of action is, accordingly, 
AFFIRMED 
of the department, institution or office in 
which such officer or employee is then em-
ployed, without reference to the provisions of 
this section. 
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be said to have discharged men for en-
gaging in a protected concerted activity 
when they had no knowledge that such 
an activity was occurring.8 
[1] In many respects this case paral-
lels that of N. L. R. B. v. Draper Cor-
poration, 4 Cir., 145 F.2d 199 at page 
205, 156 A.L.R. 989, where the court 
stated: "It should be noted that a 'wild 
cat* strike in violation of the purposes 
of the act and of an agreement existing 
between the employer and employees for 
orderly collective bargaining is clearly 
distinguishable from a strike which, al-
though not justified, nevertheless accords 
with the rights of the parties under the 
National Labor Relations Act. # # # 
[Minorities who engage in 'wild cat' 
strikes, in violation of rights established 
by the collective bargaining statute, can 
find nothing in that statute which pro-
tects them from discharge." 
Even if the walkout in this case had 
been a strike, it was a strike in violation 
of the grievance and safety procedures 4 
laid down in the contract between the 
Union and the respondent and hence was 
not a protected activity. See N. L. R. B. 
v. American Mfg. Co. of Texas, 5 Cir., 
203 F.2d 212, 216-217, and cases cited. 
[2,3] We recognize the power of the 
Board to draw "reasonable inferences" 
from the evidential facts found at the 
hearing, see Radio Officers' Union v. 
N. L. R. B., 347 U.S. 17, 74 S.Ct. 323, 
but we hold that the inferences drawn by 
the Board in this case were not reason-
able. We deny enforcement to the 
3. It is true that there is some evidence 
that management personnel of the re-
spondent had some knowledge that a 
walkout might occur on June 4, but all 
of their testimony in this regard reveals 
that they contemplated a district-wide. 
walkout such as is frequently resorted to 
by the Union as a method of showing its 
power, and not a local walkout by some 
of the men in its mine to protest the fail-
ure to correct the grievance. 
4. The contract provides for a detailed 
grievance procedure, starting with a com-
plaint by the employee or a member of 
the Union's grievance committee and the 
employee's immediate superior, through 
Board's order because we "cannot con-
scientiously find that the evidence sup-
porting that decision is substantial, when 
viewed in the light that the record in its 
entirety furnishes, including the body of 
evidence opposed to the Board's view." 
Universal Camera Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 
340 U.S. 474, 488, 71 S.Ct. 456, 465, 95 
L.Ed. 456. 
The Board's petition for enforcement 
of its order is ordered denied. 
S> 
SHALL v. HENRY etaL 
No. 10966. 
United States Court of Appeals 
Seventh Circuit 
March 5, 1954. 
Action for accounting of plaintiff's 
share of the profits realized from boxing 
matches in which defendant boxer, man-
aged by plaintiff and two other individ-
ual defendants, engaged, segregation of 
any moneys received by defendant box-
ing club corporation for defendant box-
er's and his managers' benefit, and treble 
damages for alleged conspiracy of such 
defendants and other defendant boxing 
club corporations in violation of the 
Anti-Trust Acts. From a judgment of 
the District Court for the Northern Dis-
Company channels up to the highest 
Company officer at the mine, and finally 
submission to an arbitration board con-
sisting of a member appointed by the 
Company, one appointed by the Union, 
and one appointed by these two. 
In addition, the contract calls for a 
Safety Committee composed of three 
employee and three company representa-
tives. This committee is required to hold 
bi-weekly meetings and to make sugges-
tions to the Company as to safety con-
ditions. In the event that the sugges-
tions of the committee are not carried 
out by the Company, the Union may have 
recourse to the grievance procedure. 
SHALL v. HENBY 
Cite as 211 F.2d 226 
227 
trict of Illinois, Eastern Division, Wil-
liam J. Campbell, J., dismissing plain-
tiff's fourth amended and supplemental 
complaint for want of jurisdiction, plain-
tiff appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Lindley, Circuit Judge, held that plaintiff 
being a resident of California and only 
one of defendants a resident of Illinois, 
the District Court was without jurisdic-
tion to proceed against any of defend-
ants. 
Judgment affirmed. 
L Monopolies G»12(6) 
The Anti-Trust Laws Acts are inap-
plicable to athletic contests such as box-
ing matches. Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 
§ 1-8, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-7, 15 note; Clay-
ton Act, § 1 et seq., 15 U.S.C.A. § 12 
et seq. 
2. Courts S»S59 
Whether plaintiff in action brought 
in Federal District Court for Northern 
District of Illinois for accounting of 
plaintiff's share of profits from boxing 
matches in which defendant boxer, man-
aged by plaintiff and two individual co-
defendants, engaged, has right to have 
such court decree an equitable lien on 
and isolate moneys thereafter becoming 
due such boxer from defendant boxing 
club corporation because of his partici-
pation in boxing bouts promoted by it 
must be determined by laws of Illinois. 
3. Principal and Agent <S=>90(1) 
In action against a professional box-
er, managed by plaintiff and two other 
individual defendants, for accounting of 
plaintiff's share of profits from boxing 
matches in which such boxer engaged, 
federal district court, under Illinois law, 
could not decree an equitable lien on, 
isolate, and compel defendant boxing club 
corporations to hold, funds received by 
them for such boxer's benefit because of 
his participation in bouts promoted by 
them in order that court might later de-
termine how much, if any, of such funds 
might be due plaintiff. 
4. Courts <S=>273 
The federal district court for North-
ern District of Illinois was without ju-
risdiction to proceed against any of de-
fendants in action based on diversity of 
citizenship by a California resident 
against four corporations, of which only 
one was resident of Illinois, and three 
individual defendants residing in other 
states, for accounting, though nonresi-
dent corporations were doing business in 
such district. 28 U.S.OA. § 1391. 
& Federal Civil Procedure €=>570 
The practice as to waiver of right to 
be sued in proper federal district was 
changed by federal civil procedure rule 
so that defenses to merits may now be 
set up in same pleading including de-
fenses of court's lack of jurisdiction of 
person and wrong venue without waiving 
such defenses, and special appearances 
to challenge such jurisdiction or venue 
are no longer necessary. Fed.Rules Civ. 
Proc. rule 12(b), 28 U.S.C.A. 
6. Federal Civil Procedure G=>1822 
Defendants' motions to dismiss fed-
eral district court action for want of ju-
risdiction because of lack of diversity 
of parties' citizenship after filing of 
plaintiff's fourth and final amended and 
supplemental complaint were timely, 
though defendants might have filed an-
swer setting up question of jurisdiction, 
as well as defenses on merits, without 
waiving right to object to jurisdiction. 
28 U.S.C.A. § 1391; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. 
rule 12(b), 28 U.S.C.A. 
7. Federal Civil Procedure S=>829 
Though right to amend pleadings 
.must be construed liberally, district 
.court did not abuse its discretion in de-
nying plaintiff's application to amend 
complaint after permitting three amend-
ments thereof, especially where disposi-
tion of case on points relied on by de-
fendants could not have been avoided by 
further amendments of complaint. 
Louis M. March, Chicago, 111., for ap-
pellant. 
Vincent D. McConnell, Charles H. Wat-
son, Chicago, 111., Peabody, Westbrook, 
Watson & Stephenson, Chicago, 111., of 
counsel, for appellees. 
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Before DUFFY, UNDLEY and 
SWAIM, Circuit Judges. 
UNDLEY, Circuit Judge. 
Plaintiff appeals from an order dis-
missing his suit. His original complaint, 
filed January 30, 1952, averred that he, 
a licensed manager of professional ath-
letes, had a contract with defendant 
Clarence Henry, a boxer, whereby he was 
to participate in Henry's management 
and receive a percentage of the resulting 
profits. He sought an accounting from 
defendants Henry, Stiefel and Palermo, 
the two latter being co-managers with 
plaintiff, asserting that they were at-
tempting to deprive him of his share of 
the profits realized from the boxing 
matches in which Henry had been en-
gaged from time to time and in which 
he might engage in the future. At that 
time Henry was about to participate in 
a contest under the auspices of the In-
ternational Boxing Club, Inc., an Illinois 
corporation. The Club was joined as de-
fendant, not because it was a party to 
the contract but because it was the re-
sponsible party sponsoring the match. 
Plaintiff sought to segregate such mon-
eys as might come into the hands of the 
corporation for the benefit of Henry and 
his managers. 
An application for a restraining order 
was made, at which counsel for the cor-
poration appeared, insisting that the 
court had no jurisdiction. The court, 
being fully occupied with a busy calen-
dar, referred the application to the mas-
ter for settlement of issues and recom-
mendations. On February 4, the cor-
porate defendant filed a formal motion, 
entering a special appearance, question-
ing the jurisdiction of the court and, 
shortly later, the three individual defend-
ants HeAry, Stiefel and Palermo pre-
sented a similar motion. Oit February 
21, plaintiff filed an amended complaint, 
enlarging substantially upon his original 
averments. Again all defendants en-
tered special appearances and moved to 
dismiss for want of jurisdiction* On 
March 29, plaintiff filed a second amend-
ed and supplemental complaint, further 
elaborating upon his original averments. 
The motions to dismiss for want of ju-
risdiction previously filed were allowed 
to stand to this amended complaint On 
May 9, plaintiff filed his fourth com-
plaint, calling it a "third amended and 
supplemental complaint", wherein he 
named as additional defendants Interna-
tional Boxing Club, Inc., a New York 
corporation, International Boxing Club 
of Michigan, Inc., a Michigan corpora-
tion, and International Boxing Club of 
Missouri, Inc., a Missouri corporation. 
He included in this pleading a claim 
against all defendants for treble dam-
ages incurred, as he averred, as the re-
sult of an alleged conspiracy upon their 
part in violation of the Anti-Trust laws 
of the United States. Defendants again 
interposed motions to dismiss for want 
of jurisdiction, insisting that diversity 
of citizenship did not exist; that the 
amount in controversy did not exceed 
$3000; that no valid cause of action was 
stated in the claim for damages under 
the Anti-Trust Act and that the court 
lacked jurisdiction of the suit because 
it appeared from the complaint that 
plaintiff resided in California and not in 
Illinois and that not all of the defendants 
resided in the Northern District of Illi-
nois as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1391. 
On July 14 plaintiff was permitted to 
file his fifth pleading, namely, an amend-
ed and supplemental complaint enlarging 
upon the charges for an accounting and 
upon those under the Anti-Trust Act.* 
The motions to dismiss for want of ju-
risdiction previously interposed were 
permitted to stand to this fifth and final 
complaint. 
Arguments upon the motions to dis-
miss were heard by the master on July 
22. On October 24 he filed his report, 
finding that the question of jurisdiction 
of the action under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 had 
been timely raised and that the cause 
must fail because of that statutory pro-
vision. He recommended further that, 
in view of the fact that there was no 
averment that anything was due from 
the corporate defendants, under the law 
of Illinois, they were not subject to equi-
SHALL v. 
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table garnishment; that the claim for 
accounting must, therefore, fail as to 
them, and that no sufficient cause of ac-
tion under the Anti-Trust Acts was pre 
sented against any of the defendants. 
The court approved the report of the 
master and dismissed the complaint. The 
court also refused at that time to permit 
plaintiff's motion to file a sixth pleading, 
i. e., one amending the last one filed. Up* 
on appeal plaintiff insists that the court 
erred in each of the respects mentioned. 
[1] All defendants were charged in 
the second portion of the final complaint 
with having violated the Anti-Trust 
Acts. We are of the opinion that the 
District Court rightly held that this 
claim failed to state a cause of action 
under the statute. That the business of 
professional baseball is not within the 
Anti-Trust Act, was established in Fed-
eral Baseball Club of Baltimore v. "Na* 
tional League of Professional Baseball 
Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 42 S.Ct. 465, 66 
L.Ed. 898. 
The Supreme Court, on November 
9, 1953 adhered to this doctrine in Tool* 
eon v. New York Yankees, Inc., and two 
other cases disposed of at the same time, 
346 U.S. 356, where the court declared, 
at 357, 74 S.Ct. 78, at 79, that Congress 
"had no intention of including the busi* 
ness of baseball within the scope of the 
federal antitrust laws." Those decisions 
must control unless there is some sig-
nificant legal distinction between the 
business of promoting and producing 
boxing bouts at various places in the 
United States and that of professional 
baseball. A District Court has recently 
held that boxing is not to be distin-
guished from that of a professional base 
ball game, in U, S. v. International Box* 
ing Club, Inc. (D.C.S.D.N.Y., Feb. 8, 
1954, Noonan, J.) The same court, in 
U. S. v. Schubert (Dec. 30, 1953, Knox, 
J.) held that there is no legal difference 
between theatrical production and pro-
f essional baseball. 
We agree that a professional boxing 
contest is not to be distinguished legally 
from that of a professional baseball 
game. Obviously each involves a con-
test of physical skill and endurance tak-
HENEY 229 
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ing place in a particular locality. The 
success of each depends upon the support 
of the public in the purchase of tickets 
and the sale of radio and television 
rights. Each baseball game is unique; 
no two are exactly alike. Each boxing 
contest is unlike any other. The profit-
able promotion of each depends upon the 
same elements. Under the mandate of 
the Supreme Court, therefore, we must 
hold that it was not the intention of Con-
gress to extend the provisions of the 
Anti-Trust laws to athletic contests such 
as those involved in boxing. Consequent-
ly the District Court properly dismissed 
the complaint in so far as it involved 
a suit for treble damages under the Sher-
man Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-7, 15 note, 
and the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 12 et 
seq. 
12] The corporate defendants were 
included as defendants in the accounting 
charge solely because they were said to 
be promoting boxing exhibitions and, in 
doing so, were collecting money which 
would eventually be due in part to the 
participants, a percentage of which in 
turn would accrue to plaintiff. The the-
ory seems to be that plaintiff had a right 
to have the court decree an equitable lien 
upon and isolate moneys thereafter be-
coming due defendant Henry from the 
corporation as a result of his participa-
tion in bouts. Whether such a conten-
tion is correct must be determined by 
the laws of Illinois. As the master has 
pointed out, this question has been de-
cisively determined in Lewis v. West 
Side Trust & Savings Bank, 288 111. A pp. 
271, 6 N.E.2d 481. There plaintiff 
sought to tie up moneys which he claimed 
might become due him, though held by 
third persons, by establishing an equita-
ble lien on or garnishment of the funds 
in the hands of third persons held for the 
benefit of others. The court framed the 
question thus 288 IU.App. at page 277, 
6 N.E.2d at page 484: "We gather from 
the argument of complainants that the 
purpose of this order is to retain the 
property of its stockholders in the pos-
session of the bank or the receiver so 
that should a judgment be entered in this 
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suit against a stockholder for his con-
stitutional liability, complainants could 
satisfy the judgment out of the property 
so retained by the receiver. In other 
words, such procedure and remedy as 
would be equivalent to an attachment at 
law." After discussing the Illinois au-
thorities, the court continued: "There 
is no such thing as equitable attachment 
in this state and the theory of taking 
away the control of a person's property 
by means of an injunction for the pur-
pose of anticipating a judgment which 
may or may not thereafter be obtained by 
a litigant is abhorrent to the principles 
of equitable jurisdiction. As Mr. Jus-
tice Caton said in his opinion in the 
Phelps case, which we have just quoted: 
«• « • I am not aware of any principle 
of equity jurisprudence which will jus-
tify the issuing an injunction in such a 
case, to compel the parties to hold the 
goods pending a trial at law, to see if 
they will not be wanted to answer an ex-
ecution upon a judgment which the com-
plainant hopes to obtain/ " 288 IllApp. 
at pages 278-279, 6 N.E.2d at page 484. 
[3] The Illinois statutes provide for 
attachment suits, but plaintiff has made 
no attempt to comply with those acts. 
They provide also for garnishment of 
fufct^ s, after a judgment has been entered 
but temains unsatisfied, in the hands of 
third persons, but plaintiff has not 
brought himself within those provisions. 
Therefore, under the averments of the 
complaint, in view of the Illinois deci-
sions, none of the corporate defendants 
could be compelled to hold such funds as 
might come into their hands for the ben-
efit of Henry in order that the court 
might later determine how much there-
of, if anything, might be due plaintiff. 
Consequently the court properly dis-
missed the accounting suit as to the cor-
porate defendants. 
[4] There remains for disposition, 
therefore, only the accounting charge 
against the three individual defendants. 
However, we find it unnecessary to de-
termine whether a valid claim for an ac-
counting has been presented, for the rea-
son that, in our opinion, the court was 
without jurisdiction to proceed. The 
suit was based upon diversity of citizen-
ship. 28 U.S.C. § 1391 provides that a 
civil action founded only on diversity of 
citizenship may be brought only in the 
judicial district where all plaintiffs or all 
defendants reside. The record discloses 
that plaintiff was a resident of California 
and that of the defendants only one was 
a resident of Illinois. Defendants Hen-
ry, Stief el and Palermo all resided in oth-
er states. Consequently, if the point was 
properly and timely raised, the court was 
without jurisdiction to proceed against 
any of the defendants. Seaboard Rice 
Milling Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. 
Co., 270 U.S. 363, 46 S.Ct. 247, 70 L.Ed. 
633. 
We have observed that, from the be-
ginning, each of the defendants has in-
sisted that the court was without juris-
diction. They might have filed answers 
and in them preserved the question of 
jurisdiction. Rule 12 of Civil Rules of 
Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. However, no an-
swers were filed but motions to dismiss 
for want of jurisdiction and for failure 
to state a cause of action were inter-
posed to each of the many pleadings sub-
mitted by plaintiff. Where neither de-
fendants nor plaintiff reside within the 
district, the court has no jurisdiction. 
Such is the intent of the statute and it 
must control. Blank v. Bitker, 7 Cir., 
135 F.2d 962; Martin v. Lain Oil & Gas 
Co., D.C.E.D.M., 36 F.Supp. 252. Con-
sequently the court properly dismissed 
the entire suit. Admitting arguendo 
that the nonresident corporations were 
doing business in the Northern District 
of Illinois, the fact still remains that 
none of the other defendants was a resi-
dent of that district. This fatality of 
jurisdiction is decisive. 
[5,6] We think the trial court prop-
erly found that no waiver of the rights 
to be sued in the proper district had oc-
curred. There is not the slightest bit 
of evidence in the record to show that 
defendants waived their right to object 
to the jurisdiction of the court. As we 
said in Blank v. Bitker, 7 Cir., 135 F.2d 
962, at page 966: "Under the Federal 
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Rules of Civil Procedure, which were in 
effect when this action was instituted, 
the prior practice as to waiver was 
changed so that defenses to the merits 
may now be set up in the same pleading 
which includes defenses of lack of juris* 
diction of the person and wrong venue, 
without waiving the latter defenses. 
Rule 12(b) so provides, in stating that 
'no defense or objection is waived by be-
ing joined with one or more other de-
fenses or objections in a responsive 
pleading * • • / And authorities 
supporting and applying Rule 12(b) are 
growing in number. Accordingly, spe-
cial appearances to challenge jurisdiction 
over the person or improper venue are 
no longer necessary." See also Martin 
v. Lain Oil & Gas Co., D.C., 36 F.Supp, 
252, at pages 254-255. Here, when the 
fifth and last pleading was presented, 
defendants might have filed an answer, 
setting up the question as to jurisdiction 
under Section 1391, while answering on 
the merits, without a waiver of the right 
to object because plaintiff had not 
brought himself within Section 1391. 
Rule 12(b). Instead of answering, it pre-
sented its motion to dismiss. We agree 
with the master that this was timely 
pleading. 
[7] In view of the many amendments 
to the complaint permitted by the court 
and the voluminous pleadings filed as 
a result, even though the right to amend 
is to be construed liberally, we think the 
court did not abuse its discretion in de-
nying at the time of judgment applica-
tion to amend still further. There must 
be an end sometime to applications to 
amend. Plaintiff had five chances to 
state his case. Under the circumstances 
disclosed by the record, there was no 
abuse of discretion in this respect. This 
conclusion is fortified by the fact that 
the disposition of this case upon the 
points upon which we have relied could 
not have been avoided by further amend-
ments. The fatal questions of jurisdic-
tion and venue could not have been avoid-
ed by any amendment The fact that no 
proper action under the Anti-Trust Act 
exists could not have been obviated. Con-
sequently, whether the amendment was 
allowed or not, this court would have 
been impelled to reach the conclusion it 
has reached on the deficiencies referred 
to in this opinion. 
In view of our conclusions we do not 
reach the further questions submitted by 
the parties. The judgment is 
Affirmed. 
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UNITED CORP. 
v. 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION. 
Nos. 11120, 11130. 
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Argued Jan. 18, 1954. 
Decided Feb. 24,1954. 
Proceeding on petitions to review 
supplemental order of Securities and 
Exchange Commission reducing attor-
neys' fee for services in connection with 
dissolution of public utility corporation 
and disallowing compensation for ex-
penses incurred by parent holding com-
pany. The Court of Appeals, McLaugh-
lin, Circuit Judge, held that evidence 
established that commission acted un-
reasonably in reducing attorneys' fee 
agreed to by attorneys and dissolved 
corporation, but that refusal of compen-
sation to parent holding company was 
not unreasonable. 
Order affirmed in part and reversed 
and remanded in part. 
